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Abstract
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications
of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually
designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and, at the
same time, to assure both the advertisers and the auctioneer a non–negative
utility. Nonetheless, in sponsored search auctions, the click–through–rates
(CTRs) of the advertisers are often unknown to the auctioneer and thus
standard truthful mechanisms cannot be directly applied and must be paired
with an effective learning algorithm for the estimation of the CTRs. This
introduces the critical problem of designing a learning mechanism able to
estimate the CTRs at the same time as implementing a truthful mechanism
with a revenue loss as small as possible compared to an optimal mechanism
designed with the true CTRs. Previous work showed that, when dominant–
strategy truthfulness is adopted, in single–slot auctions the problem can be
solved using suitable exploration–exploitation mechanisms able to achieve
a per–step regret (over the auctioneer’s revenue) of order O(T−
1
3 ) (where
T is the number of times the auction is repeated). It is also known that,
when truthfulness in expectation is adopted, a per–step regret (over the social
welfare) of order O(T−
1
2 ) can be obtained. In this paper we extend the results
known in the literature to the more complex case of multi–slot auctions. In
this case, a model of the user is needed to characterize how the advertisers’
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valuations change over the slots. We adopt the cascade model that is the
most famous model in the literature for sponsored search auctions. We prove
a number of novel upper bounds and lower bounds both on the auctioneer’s
revenue loss and social welfare w.r.t. to the VCG auction and we report
numerical simulations investigating the accuracy of the bounds in predicting
the dependency of the regret on the auction parameters.
Keywords: Economic paradigms, mechanism design, online learning,
sponsored search auctions.
1. Introduction
Sponsored search auctions (SSAs) constitute one of the most successful
applications of microeconomic mechanisms, producing a revenue of about
$6 billion dollars in the US alone in the first half of 2010 [1]. In a SSA, a
number of advertisers bid to have their sponsored links (from here on ads)
displayed in some slot alongside the search results of a keyword. Sponsored
search auctions currently adopt a pay–per–click scheme, requiring positive
payments to an advertiser only if its ad has been clicked. Given an allocation
of ads over the slots, each ad is associated with a click–through–rate (CTR)
defined as the probability that such ad will be clicked by the user. CTRs are
estimated by the auctioneer and play a crucial role in the auction, since they
are used by the auctioneer to find the optimal allocation (in expectation)
and to compute the payments for each ad.
There is a large number of works formalizing SSAs as a mechanism de-
sign problem [2], where the objective is to design an auction mechanism that
incentivizes advertisers to bid their truthful valuations (needed for economic
stability) and that assures both the advertisers and the auctioneer to have
a non–negative utility. The most common SSA mechanism is the general-
ized second price (GSP) auction [3, 4]. This mechanism is proved not to be
truthful and advertisers may implement bidding strategies that gain more
than bidding their truthful valuations as shown in [3]. While in complete
information settings the worst Nash equilibrium in the GSP gives a revenue
to the auctioneer equal to the revenue given by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
(VCG) equilibrium [3], in Bayesian settings the worst Bayes–Nash equilib-
rium in the GSP can provide a much smaller revenue than the VCG—a lower
bound of 1
8
is provided in [5]. The implementation of the VCG mechanism
(assuring truthfulness) for SSAs has been investigated in [2]. Although the
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VCG mechanism is not currently adopted by the search engines (but it is,
e.g., by Facebook), a number of scientific theoretical results builds upon it.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of designing truthful mechanisms
when the CTRs are not known and need to be estimated in SSAs with mul-
tiple slots. This problem is particularly relevant in practice because the
assumption that all the CTRs are known beforehand is rarely realistic. Fur-
thermore, it also poses interesting scientific challenges since it represents one
of the first examples where learning theory is paired with mechanism design
techniques to obtain effective methods to learn under equilibrium constraints
(notably the truthfulness property). Another field where these ideas have
been used is crowdsourcing [6]. The problem of estimating the CTRs and
to identify the best allocation of ads is effectively formalized as a multi–arm
bandit problem [7] where each ad is an arm and the objective is to minimize
the cumulative regret (i.e., the revenue loss w.r.t. an optimal allocation de-
fined according to the exact CTRs). The problem of budgeted advertisers
(i.e., auctions where the total amount of money each advertiser is willing
to pay is limited) with multiple queries is considered in [8]. This problem
is formalized as a budgeted multi–bandit multi–arm problem, where each
bandit corresponds to a query, and an algorithm is proposed with explicit
bounds over the regret on the revenue. Nonetheless, the proposed method
works in a non–strategic environment, where the advertisers do not try to
influence the outcome of the auction and always bid their true values. The
strategic dimension of SSAs is partially taken into consideration in [9] where
the advertisers are assumed to play a bidding strategy at the equilibrium
w.r.t. a set of estimated CTRs which are available to both the auctioneer
and the advertisers. The authors introduce a learning algorithm which ex-
plores different rankings on the ads so as to improve the CTR estimates and,
at the same, not to introduce incentives for the advertisers to deviate from
the previous equilibrium strategy. A more complete notion of truthfulness for
bandit algorithms in multi–slot SSAs is studied in [10]. In particular, they
build on the action elimination algorithm in [11] and they report a probably
approximately correct (PAC) analysis of its performance. Unfortunately, as
pointed in [12] and [13] the mechanism is not guaranteed to be truthful and
thus it only works when the advertisers bid their true values. An exten-
sion to the action elimination algorithm is also proposed in [14] for the more
general setting where budgeted advertisers are allowed to enter and exit the
auction at different time instants that they declare along with their bid. The
authors derive an algorithm that approximately achieves the best social wel-
3
fare under the assumption that the gain of untruthful declarations is limited.
Finally, single–slot online advertising is studied also in [15] where the notion
of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) is taken into consideration and
an asymptotically BIC and ex ante efficient mechanism is introduced. The
most complete study of truthful bandit mechanisms so far is reported in [12]
and [13]. These works first provided a complete analysis on the constraints
truthfulness forces on the multi–arm bandit algorithm with single–slot SSAs,
showing that no dominant–strategy truthful bandit mechanism can achieve a
regret (over the social welfare and over the auctioneer’s revenue) smaller than
Ω˜(T
2
3 ) and that the exploration and exploitation phases must be separate.
Furthermore, they also suggest nearly–optimal algorithms. Instead, when
the notion of truthfulness is relaxed, adopting truthfulness in expectation
w.r.t. click (and possibly mechanism) randomness, it is possible to obtain
a regret O˜(T
1
2 ) (over the social welfare) without separating the exploration
and exploitation phases in the case of single–slot SSAs [16].
When multiple slots are present, a user model is needed to describe how
the valuations of the advertisers change over the slots. All the models avail-
able in the literature assume the separation of the CTR as the product of
two terms, the first capturing the probability that an ad will be clicked once
observed by the user, while the second capturing the probability that the
user will observe such an ad given the displayed allocation. The basic model
(commonly referred to as separability model) prescribes that the probability
of observing an ad depends only on its position [2]. Recently, more accu-
rate models have been proposed and the most famous model is the cascade
model according to which the user scans the slots from top to bottom and the
probability with which the user moves from a slot to the next one depends
on the ad and on the slot (this kind of user is commonly called Markovian
user) [17, 18], while with the remaining probability the user stops to observe
ads. As a result, the probability of observing an ad depends on position of
the ad and on all the ads allocated above. The validity of the cascade model
has been evaluated and supported by a wide range of experimental inves-
tigations [19, 20]. The only results on learning mechanisms for SSAs with
multiple slots are described in [21], where the authors characterize dominant–
strategy truthful mechanisms and provide theoretical bounds over the social
welfare regret for the separability model. However, these results are partial,
e.g., they do not solve the common case in which the slot–dependent param-
eters are monotonically decreasing in the slots, and they cannot easily be
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extended to the more challenging case of the cascade model (see discussion
in Section 3.3).
In the present paper, we build on the results available in the literature and
we provide a number of contributions when the separability model and the
cascade model are adopted. More precisely, our results can be summarized
as follow.
• Separability model with monotone parameters/only position–dependent
cascade model : in this case, there are two groups of parameters, one
related to the ads (called quality) and one to the slots (called promi-
nence). We studied all configurations of information incompleteness.
When only qualities are unknown, we provide a regret analysis in
dominant–strategy truthfulness obtaining a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ) (while it
is open whether it is possible to obtain a better upper bound adopting
truthfulness in expectation). When only prominences are unknown,
we provide a regret analysis in truthfulness in expectation obtaining
a regret of 0, whereas we show that any dominant–strategy truthful
learning mechanism would have a regret of Θ˜(T ). When both groups
of parameters are unknown, we provide a regret analysis in truthfulness
in expectation obtaining a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ) (while it is open whether
it is possible to obtain a better upper bound adopting truthfulness in
expectation), whereas any dominant–strategy truthful learning mech-
anism would have a regret of Θ˜(T ).
• Cascade model : in the non–factorized cascade model (i.e., when the ob-
servation probabilities can be any) we show that it is possible to obtain
a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ) in dominant–strategy truthful learning mechanisms
when only the qualities of the ads are unknown. We show also that in
the factorized cascade model (i.e., when the observation probabilities
are the products of terms depending only on the position or on the ads
as used in [17]), in the very special case in which the ad–dependent pa-
rameters are unknown we obtain a regret of Θ˜(T ) in dominant–strategy
truthful learning mechanisms (while it is open whether it is possible to
obtain a better upper bound adopting truthfulness in expectation).
• Learning parameters : for each setting of uncertainty we study we pro-
vide functions, to be used in practice, to set the learning parameters in
order to minimize the bound over the regret given the parameters in
input.
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• Numerical simulations : we investigate the accuracy of all the bounds
we provide in the paper in predicting the dependency of the regret on
the auction parameters by numerical simulations. We show that the
theoretical dependency matches the actual dependency we observed by
simulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the basics
of mechanism design and multi–armed bandit learning. Section 3 formalizes
sponsored search auctions and introduces the corresponding online learning
mechanism design problem. In Section 3 we also provide a more formal
overview of existing results in comparison with the findings of this paper.
In Sections 4 and 5 we report and discuss the main regret bounds in the
case of position–dependent and position– and ad–dependent externalities.
In Section 6 we report numerical simulations aiming at testing the accuracy
of the theoretical bounds. Section 7 concludes the paper and proposes future
directions of investigation. The detailed proofs of the theorems are reported
in Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Economic Mechanisms
In this section we provide some background on mechanism design. The
aim of mechanism design [22] is to design allocation and payment functions
satisfying some desirable properties when agents are rational and have private
information representing their preferences—also referred to as the type of the
agent. Without loss of generality, mechanism design focuses on mechanisms,
said direct, in which the only action available to the agents is to report
their (potentially non–truthful) type. On the basis of the agents’ reports the
mechanism determines the allocation (of resources) to agents and the agents’
payments.
The main desirable property of a mechanism is truthfulness—aka incen-
tive compatibility (IC)—and requires that reporting the true types constitutes
an equilibrium strategy profile for the agents. When a mechanism is not truth-
ful, agents should find their (untruthful) best strategies on the basis of some
possible model about the opponents’ behavior, but, in absence of common
information, no normative model for rational agents exists. This leads the
mechanism to be economically unstable, given that the agents continuously
change their strategies. As it is customary in game theory, there are different
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solution concepts and consequently there are different notions of truthful-
ness. The most common ones are dominant strategy incentive compatibility
(DSIC)—i.e., reporting the true types is the best action an agent can play
independently of the actions of the other agents—, ex post incentive compat-
ibility (ex post IC)—i.e., reporting the true types is a Nash equilibrium—,
and Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC)—i.e., reporting the true types is
a Bayes–Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, DSIC and ex post IC are equivalent
notions of truthfulness in absence of interdependencies, while BIC is weaker
than DSIC since it requires that every agent has a Bayesian prior over the
types of the other agents and IC is in expectation w.r.t. the prior. When
there are sources of randomness in the mechanism design problem (not due
to the distribution of probabilities over the types of the agents), e.g., random
components of the mechanism or the realization of events, weaker solution
concepts, said in expectation, are commonly adopted, e.g., DSIC in expecta-
tion or ex post IC in expectation. Since in the present paper we will only
focus on DSIC, whenever some source of randomization is present (e.g., clicks
or randomized mechanisms), we will use “IC” or “DSIC” to refer to DSIC
a posteriori, and “IC in expectation” for “DSIC in expectation”. Moreover,
mechanisms can exploit the realizations of the events adopting different pay-
ment functions for each different realization. These mechanisms are said
execution contingent (EC) [23, 24].
In addition to IC, other desirable properties include: allocative efficiency
(AE)—i.e., the allocation maximizes the social welfare—, individual ratio-
nality (IR)—i.e., each agent is guaranteed to have no loss when reporting
truthfully—, and weak budget balance (WBB)—i.e., the mechanism is guar-
anteed to have no loss. In presence of sources of randomness, IR and WBB
can be in expectation w.r.t. all the possible realizations, or a posteriori if
they hold for every possible realization.
The economic literature provides an important characterization of the
allocation functions that can be adopted in IC mechanisms when utilities
are quasi linear [22]. Here, we survey the main results related to DSIC
mechanisms. In unrestricted domains (i.e., the agents’ types are defined over
spaces with arbitrary structure) for the agents’ preferences, only weighted
maximal–in–its–range allocation functions can be adopted in DSIC mecha-
nisms [25, 26]. More precisely, a weighted maximal–in–its–range allocation
function chooses, among a subset of allocations that does not depend on the
types reported by the agents (i.e., the range), the allocation maximizing the
weighted social welfare, where each agent is associated with a positive (type–
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independent) weight. It trivially follows that, when the range is composed
of all the possible allocations and all the agents have the same weights, only
AE mechanisms can be DSIC. When weighted maximal–in–its–range allo-
cation functions are adopted, only weighted Groves payments lead to DSIC
mechanisms [22]. The most common DSIC mechanism is the Vickrey–Clarke–
Groves (VCG), in which the range is composed of all the allocations and all
the weights are unitary. VCG satisfies also IR and WBB and, among all the
Groves mechanisms, the VCG is the mechanism maximizing the revenue of
the auctioneer. We refer to the weighted version of the VCG as WVCG.
When the domain of the agents’ preferences is restricted (i.e., the types
are defined over spaces with specific structure, e.g., compact sets or discrete
values), weighted maximal–in–its–range property is not necessary for DISC.
The necessary condition is weakly monotonicity [22], which is also sufficient
for convex domains. In specific restricted domains, weak monotonicity leads
to simple and operational tools. For instance, when the preferences of the
agents are single–parameter linear—i.e., the agents’ value is given as the
product between the agent’s type and an allocation–dependent coefficient
called load [27]—, monotonicity requires that the load is monotonically in-
creasing in the type of the agent. In this case, any DSIC mechanism is based
on the Myerson’s payments defined in [27].1 Notice that the VCG mecha-
nism is still the mechanism maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue among all
the DSIC mechanism, including those that are not AE. The payments defined
in [27] include an integral that may be not easily computable. However, by
adopting IC in expectation (over the randomness of the mechanism), such
integral can be easily estimated by using samples [28]. Another drawback
of the payments described in [27] is that they require the off–line evaluation
of the social welfare of the allocations for some agents’ types different from
the reported ones and this may be not possible in many practical situations.
A way to overcome this issue is to adopt the result presented in [16], in
which the authors propose an implicit way to calculate the payments. More
precisely, given an allocation function in input, a random component is intro-
duced such that with a small probability the reported types of the agents are
modified to obtain the allocations that are needed to compute the payments
in [27]. The resulting allocation function is less efficient than the allocation
1See Appendix A for the definition of monotonicity in single–parameter linear environ-
ments and Myerson’s payments.
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function given in input, but the computation of the payments is possible and
it is executed online.
2.2. Multi–Armed Bandit
The multi–arm bandit (MAB) [7] is a simple yet powerful framework for-
malizing the online decision–making problem under uncertainty. Historically,
the MAB framework finds its motivation in optimal experimental design in
clinical trials, where two new treatments, say A and B, need to be tested.
In an idealized version of the clinical trial, T patients are sequentially en-
rolled in the trial, so that whenever a treatment is tested on a patient, the
outcome of the test is recorded and it is used to choose which treatment to
provide to the next patient. The objective is to provide the best treatment
to the largest number of patients. This raises the challenge of balancing the
collection of information and the maximization of the performance, a prob-
lem usually referred to as the exploration–exploitation trade–off. In fact, on
the one hand, it is important to gather information about the effectiveness of
the two treatments by repeatedly providing them at different patients (explo-
ration). On the other hand, in order to meet the objective, as an estimation
of effectiveness of the two treatments is available, the (estimated) best treat-
ment should be selected more often (exploitation). This scenario matches
with a large number of applications, such as online advertisements, adaptive
routing, cognitive radio. In general, the MAB framework can be adopted
whenever a set of N arms (e.g., treatments, ads) is available and the rewards
(e.g., effectiveness of a treatment, click–through–rate of an ad) associated
to each of them are random realizations from unknown distributions. Al-
though this problem can be solved by dynamic programming methods and
notably by using the Gittins index solution [29], this requires a prior over
the distribution of the reward of the arms and it is often computationally
heavy (high–degree polynomial in T ). More recently, a wide range of tech-
niques have been developed to solve the bandit problem. In particular, these
algorithms formalize the objective using the notion of regret, which corre-
sponds to the difference in performance over T steps between an optimal
selection strategy which knows in advance the performance of all the arms
and an adaptive strategy which learns over time which arms to select. Al-
though a complete review of the bandit algorithms is beyond the scope of
this paper (see [30] for a review), we only discuss two results which are rele-
vant to the rest of the paper. The exploration–separated algorithms solve the
exploration–exploitation trade–off by introducing a strict separation between
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the exploration and the exploitation phases. While during the exploration
phase all the arms are uniformly selected, in the exploitation phase only the
best estimated arm is selected until the end of the experiment. The length τ
of the exploration phase is critical to guarantee the success of the experiment
and it is possible to show that if properly tuned, the worst–case cumulative
regret scales as O(T 2/3). Another class of algorithms interleave exploration
and exploitation and rely on the construction of confidence intervals for the
reward of each arm. In particular, the upper–confidence bound (UCB) algo-
rithm [31] gives an extra exploration bonus to arms which have been selected
only few times in the past and it achieves a worst–case cumulative regret
of order O(T 1/2). Although this represents a clear improvement over the
exploration–separated algorithms, as reviewed in the introduction, in some
web advertising applications considered in this paper, it is not possible to
preserve incentive compatibility when exploration and exploitation are inter-
leaved over time.
3. Problem statement
In this section we introduce all the notation used throughout the rest of
the paper. In particular, we formalize the sponsored search auction model, we
define the mechanism design problem, and we introduce the learning process.
3.1. Sponsored search auction model
We resort to the standard model of sponsored search auctions [2]. We
denote by N = {1, . . . , N} the set of ads indexes and by ai with i ∈ N the
i–th ad (we assume w.l.o.g. each advertiser has only one ad and therefore
we can identify by ai the i–th ad and the i–th advertiser indifferently). Each
ad ai is characterized by a quality qi corresponding to the probability that ai
is clicked once observed by the user, and by a value vi ∈ V, with V = [0, V ]
and V ∈ R+, which ai receives when clicked (ai receives a value of zero if not
clicked). We denote by v the profile (v1, . . . , vN) and, as customary in game
theory, by v−i the profile obtained by removing vi from v. While qualities
{qi}i∈N are commonly known by the auctioneer, values {vi}i∈N are private
information of the advertisers. We denote by K = {1, . . . , K} with K < N ,2
the set of slot indexes and by sm with m ∈ K the m–th slot from top to
2Although K < N is the most common case, the results could be smoothly extended
to K > N .
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bottom. For notational convenience, we also define the extended set of slots
indexes K′ = K ∪ {K + 1, . . . , N}.
We denote by the ordered pair 〈sm, ai〉 that ad ai is allocated into slot
sm, by θ a generic allocation and by Θ the set of all the possible allocations.
Although in an auction only K ads can be actually displayed, we define an
allocation as θ = {〈m, i〉 : m ∈ K′, i ∈ N} where both m and i occur exactly
once and any ad assigned to a slot m > K is not displayed. We define two
maps π : N ×Θ→ K′ and α : K′×Θ→ N such that π(i; θ) returns the slot
in which ai is displayed in allocation θ and α(m; θ) returns the ad allocated
in slot sm in allocation θ. Given θ ∈ Θ, we have that π(i; θ) = m if and only
if α(m; θ) = i.
With more than one slot, it is necessary to adopt a model of the user
describing how the expected value of an advertiser varies over the slots. We
assume that the user behaves according to the popular cascade model defined
by [17, 18]. In particular, the user’s behavior can be modeled as a Markov
chain whose states correspond to the slots, which are observed sequentially
from the top to the bottom, and the transition probability corresponds to
the probability of observing the ad ai displayed in the next slot; with the
remaining probability the user stops observing the ads. This probability may
depend on the index of the slot (i.e., π(i; θ)), in this case the externalities
are said position–dependent, and/or on the ad that precedes ai in the current
allocation θ (i.e., α(π(i; θ) − 1; θ)), in this case the externalities are said
ad–dependent.
In the general case, the cascade model can be described by introducing
parameters γm,i defined as the probability that a user observing ad ai in
slot sm observes the ad in the next slot sm+1. It can be easily seen that there
are KN different parameters γm,i. The (cumulative) probability that a user
observes the ad displayed at slot sm in allocation θ is denoted by Γm(θ) and
it is defined as:
Γm(θ) =

1 if m = 1
m−1∏
l=1
γl,α(l;θ) if 2 ≤ m ≤ K
0 otherwise
(1)
Given an allocation θ, the click through rate (CTR) of ad ai is the probability
to be clicked once allocated according to θ and it is equal to Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qi. Simi-
larly, the CTR of the ad displayed at slotm can be computed as Γm(θ)qα(m;θ).
We notice that, according to this model, the user might click multiple ads
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at each impression. Given an allocation θ, the expected value (w.r.t. the
user’s clicks) of advertiser ai from θ is Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qivi, that is, the product of
the CTR Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qi by the value of the advertiser vi. The advertisers’ cu-
mulative expected value from allocation θ, commonly referred to as social
welfare, is:
SW(θ,v) =
N∑
i=1
Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qivi
In [17, 18], the authors factorize the probability γm,i as the product of two
independent terms: the prominence λm, which only depends on the slot sm,
and the continuation probability ci, which only depends on the ad ai. This
leads to a reduction of the number of the parameters from KN to K +N .3
Finally, we denote by clickim ∈ {0, 1} the click/no–click event for ad ai
allocated in slot m.
3.2. Mechanism design problem
A direct–revelation economic mechanism for sponsored search auctions is
formally defined as a tuple (N ,V,Θ, f, {pi}i∈N ) where N is the set of agents
(i.e., the advertisers), V is the set of possible actions available to the agents
(i.e., the possible reported values), Θ is the set of the outcomes (i.e., the
allocations), f is the allocation function f : VN → Θ, and pi is the payment
function of advertiser ai defied as pi : VN → R. We denote by vˆi the value
reported by advertiser ai to the mechanism, by vˆ the profile of reported
values and vˆ−i the profile obtained by removing vˆi from vˆ.
At the beginning of an auction, each advertiser ai reports its value vˆi. The
mechanism chooses the allocation on the basis of the advertisers’ reports as
f(vˆ) and subsequently computes the payment of each advertiser ai as pi(vˆ).
The expected utility of advertiser ai is defined as Γpi(i;f(vˆ))f(vˆ)qivi − pi(vˆ).
Since each advertiser is an expected utility maximizer, it will misreport its
3The allocation problem when either all the prominence probabilities λms or all the
continuation probabilities cis are equal to one can be solved in polynomial time, while,
although no formal proof is known, the allocation problem with λms and cis different from
one is commonly believed to be NP–hard [17]. However, the allocation problem can be
solved exactly for concrete settings and for very large settings approximation algorithms
can be adopted as shown in [32]. In this paper, we just focus on optimal allocation
functions.
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value (i.e., vˆi 6= vi) whenever this may lead its utility to increase. Mechanism
design aims at finding an allocation function f and a vector of payments
{pi}i∈N such that some desirable properties—discussed in Section 2.1—are
satisfied [22].
When all the parameters qi and γm,i are known, the VCG mechanism
satisfies IC in expectation (over click realizations), IR in expectation (over
click realizations), WBB a posteriori (w.r.t. click realizations), and AE. In
the VCG mechanism, the allocation function, denoted by f ∗, maximizes the
social welfare given the reported types as:
θ∗ = f ∗(vˆ) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
{SW(θ, vˆ)} (2)
and payments are defined as
p∗i (vˆ) = SW(θ
∗
−i, vˆ−i)− SW−i(θ∗, vˆ), (3)
where:
• θ∗−i = f ∗(vˆ−i), i.e., the optimal allocation when advertiser ai is not
present,
• SW−i(θ∗, vˆ) =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Γpi(j;θ∗)(θ
∗)qj vˆj , i.e., the cumulative expected value
of the optimal allocation θ∗ minus the expected value of advertiser ai.
In words, the payment of advertiser ai is the difference between the social
welfare that could be obtained from allocation θ∗−i computed removing ad ai
from the auction and the social welfare of the efficient allocation θ∗ without
the contribution of advertiser ai. The extension of the VCG mechanism
do weighted ads (the WVCG mechanism) is straightforward. The weighted
social welfare is SWw(θ,v) =
∑N
i=1 Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qiviwi where wi is the weight of
advertiser i. In the WVCG, the allocation maximizing the weighted social
welfare is chosen, while the payment is defined as pwi (vˆ) =
1
wi
(SWw(θ∗−i, vˆ−i)−
SWw−i(θ
∗, vˆ)).
The previous mechanism is IC and IR in expectation, but it is not DSIC
and IR a posteriori w.r.t. the clicks (an advertiser may have a positive
payment even when its ad has not been clicked). Nonetheless, the mechanism
can be easily modified to satisfy DSIC and IR a posteriori w.r.t. the clicks
by using pay–per–click payments p∗,ci as follows:
p∗,ci (vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ∗)) =
SW(θ∗−i, vˆ−i)− SW−i(θ∗, vˆ)
Γpi(i;θ∗)(θ∗)qi
I{clickipi(i;θ∗)}, (4)
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where I{·} denotes the indicator function. The contingent formulation of the
payments is such that E[pci(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ∗))] = p
∗
i (vˆ), where the expectation is
w.r.t. the click event, which is distributed as a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter coinciding with the CTR of ad ai in allocation θ
∗, i.e., Γpi(i;θ∗)qi.
Similar definitions hold for the WVCG.
3.3. Online learning mechanism design problem
In many practical problems, the parameters (i.e., qi and γm,i) are not
known in advance by the auctioneer and must be estimated at the same time
as the auction is deployed. This introduces a tradeoff between exploring
different possible allocations so as to collect information about the parame-
ters and exploiting the estimated parameters so as to implement a truthful
high–revenue auction (i.e., a VCG mechanism). This problem could be easily
casted as a multi–arm bandit problem [7] and standard techniques could be
used to solve it, e.g., [33]. Nonetheless, such an approach would completely
overlook the strategic dimension of the problem: advertisers may choose their
reported values at each round t to influence the outcome of the auction at
t and/or in future rounds after t in order to increase the cumulative utility
over all the rounds of the horizon T . Thus, in this context, truthfulness re-
quires that reporting the truthful valuation maximizes the cumulative utility
over all the horizon T . The truthfulness can be: in dominant strategies if
advertisers know everything (including, e.g., the ads that will be clicked at
each round t if displayed) or in expectation. As customary, we adopt three
forms of truthfulness in expectation: IC in expectation over the click realiza-
tions and a posteriori w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of the
mechanism (if such a component is present), IC in expectation over the real-
izations of the random component of the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t.
the click realizations, and, finally, IC in expectation over both randomiza-
tions. We consider IC in expectation over the click realizations weaker than
IC in expectation over the realizations of the random mechanism since each
advertiser could control the clicks by using software bots.
Thus, here we face the more challenging problem where the exploration–
exploitation dilemma must be solved so as to maximize the revenue of the
auction under the hard constraint of incentive compatibility. Let A be an IC
mechanism run over T rounds. We assume, as it is common in practice, that
the advertisers’ reports can change during these T rounds. At each round t,
A defines an allocation θt and prescribes an expected payment pi,t(vˆ) for each
ad ai. The objective of A is to obtain a revenue as close as possible to a VCG
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mechanism computed on the basis of the actual parameters.4 More precisely,
we measure the performance of A as its cumulative regret over T rounds:
RT (A) = T
n∑
i=1
p∗i (vˆ)−
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
pi,t(vˆ).
We remark that the regret is not defined on the basis of the pay–per–click
payments asked on a specific sequence of clicks but on the expected payments
pi,t(vˆ). Furthermore, since the learning mechanism A estimates the param-
eters from the observed (random) clicks, the expected payments pi,t(vˆ) are
random as well. Thus, in the following we will study the expected regret:
RT (A) = E[RT (A)], (5)
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. random sequences of clicks and pos-
sibly the randomness of the mechanism. The mechanism A is a no–regret
mechanism if its per–round regret RT (A)/T decreases to 0 as T increases,
i.e., lim
T→∞
RT (A)/T = 0. Another popular definition of performance [10, 13]
is the social welfare regret, denoted by RSWT and measured as the difference
between the (expected) social welfare of the optimal allocation θ∗ and the
(expected) social welfare of the best allocation θ˜ found with the estimated
parameters (i.e., SW(θ∗, vˆ)−SW(θ˜, vˆ)). We notice that minimizing the social
welfare regret does not coincide with minimizing RT . In fact, once the quality
estimates are accurate enough, such that θt is equal to θ
∗, the social welfare
regret drops to zero. On the other hand, since pi,t(vˆ) is defined according
to the estimated qualities, RT (A) might still be positive even if θt = θ
∗.
In addition, we believe that in practical applications providing a theoretical
bound over the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue is more important rather
than a bound on the regret of the social welfare.5
The study of the problem when K = 1 is well established in the litera-
ture. More precisely, the properties required to have a DSIC mechanism are
studied in [12] and it is shown that any learning algorithm must split the
exploration and the exploitation in two separate phases in order to incen-
tivize the advertisers to report their true values. This condition has a strong
4We refer the reader to Appendix F for a slightly different definition of regret measuring
the deviation from the revenue of a VGC mechanism.
5However, we show that our bounds over the regret of auctioneer’s revenue can be
easily extended also to the regret of the social welfare.
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impact on the regret RT (A) of the mechanism. In fact, while in a standard
bandit problem the distribution–free regret is of order Ω(T 1/2), in single–slot
auctions, DSIC mechanisms cannot achieve a regret smaller than Ω(T 2/3).
In [12] a truthful learning mechanism is designed with a nearly optimal re-
gret of order O˜(T 2/3).6 Similar structural properties for DSIC mechanisms
are also studied in [13] and similar lower–bounds are derived for the social
welfare regret. The authors show in [16] that, by introducing a random com-
ponent in the allocation function and resorting to truthfulness in expectation
over the realizations of the random component of the mechanism, the sepa-
ration of exploration and exploitation phases can be avoided. In this case,
the upper bound over the regret over the social welfare is O(T 1/2) matching
the best bound of standard distribution–free bandit problems. However, the
payments of this mechanism suffer of potentially high variance. Although
it is expected that with this mechanism also the regret over the auctioneer
revenue is of the order of O(T 1/2), no formal proof is known.
On the other hand, the study of the problem when K > 1 is still mostly
open. In this case, a crucial role is played by the CTR model. While with
only one slot, the advertisers’ CTRs coincide to their qualities qi, with mul-
tiple slots the CTRs may also depend on the slots and the allocation of the
other ads. The only results on learning mechanisms for sponsored search
auction with K > 1 are described in [21], where the authors characterize
DSIC mechanisms and provide theoretical bounds over the social welfare re-
gret. More precisely, the authors assume a simple CTR model in which the
CTR itself depends on the ad i and the slot m. This model differs from the
cascade model (see Section 2.1) where the CTR is a more complex function
of the quality qi of an ad and the cumulative probability of observation Γm(θ)
which, in general, depends on both the slot m and the full allocation θ (i.e.,
the ads allocated before slot sm). It can be easily shown that the model
studied in [21] does not include and, at the same time, is not included by
the cascade model. However, the two models correspond when the CTRs
are separable in two terms in which the first is the agents’ quality and the
second is a parameter in [0, 1] monotonically decreasing in the slots (i.e.,
only–position–dependent cascade model). Furthermore, while the cascade
model is supported by an empirical activity which confirms its validity as a
6The O˜ notation hides both constant and logarithmic factors, that is RT ≤ O˜(T 2/3) if
there exist a and b such that RT ≤ aT 2/3 logb T .
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model of the user behavior [19, 20], the model considered in [21] has not been
empirically studied. In [21], the authors show that when the CTRs are un-
restricted (e.g., they are not strictly monotonically decreasing in the slots),
then the regret over the social welfare is Θ(T ) and therefore at every round
(of repetition of the auction) a non–zero regret is accumulated. In addition,
the authors provide necessary and, in some situations, sufficient conditions
to have DSIC in restricted environments (i.e., higher slot higher click prob-
ability, separable CTRs in which only ads qualities need to be estimated),
without presenting any bound over the regret (except for reporting an exper-
imental evidence that the regret is Ω(T 2/3) when the CTRs are separable).
We summarize in Tab. 1 the known results from the literature and, in
bold font, the original results provided in this paper.
slots CTR model unknown solution regret over regret over
parameters concept social welfare auctioneer revenue
1 – qi DSIC Θ(T
2/3) Θ(T 2/3)
IC in exp. O(T 1/2) O(T 2/3)
> 1 (unconstrained) CTRi,m CTRi,m DISC Θ(T ) unknown
(unfactorized) cascade qi DISC O(T2/3) Θ(T2/3)
γi,s DISC Θ(T) Θ(T)
position–dep. cascade / λm DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
separable CTRi,m IC in exp. 0 0
(w.r.t. clicks)
IC in exp. O(1) O(1)
(w.r.t. mechanism)
qi, λm DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
IC in exp. O(T2/3) O(T2/3)
ad–dependent cascade ci DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
qi, ci DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
Table 1: Known results on regret bounds for sponsored search auction. We remark with
bold font the results provided in this paper.
4. Learning with Position–Dependent Externalities
In this section we study the multi–slot auctions with only position–
dependent cascade model. The CTRs depend only on the quality of the
ads and on the position of the slots in which the ads are allocated. Formally,
parameters γm,i are such that they coincide with the prominence parameter
(i.e., γm,i = λm for every m and i). As a result, the cumulative probability
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of observation, defined in (1), reduces to
Λm = Γm(θ) =

1 if m = 1
m−1∏
l=1
λl if 2 ≤ m ≤ K
0 otherwise
, (6)
where we use Λm instead of Γm(θ) for consistency with most of the literature
on position–dependent externalities and to stress the difference with respect
to the general case.
When all the parameters are known by the auctioneer, the efficient alloca-
tion θ∗ prescribes that the ads are allocated to the slots in decreasing order
w.r.t. their expected reported value qivˆi. More precisely, for any k ∈ K′,
let max
i∈N
(qivˆi; k) be the operator returning the k–th largest value in the set
{q1vˆ1, . . . , qN vˆN}, then θ∗ is such that, for every m ∈ K′, the ad displayed at
slot m is
α(m; θ∗) ∈ argmax
i∈N
(qivˆi;m). (7)
This condition also simplifies the definition of the efficient allocation θ∗−i when
ai is removed from N . In fact, for any i, j ∈ N , if π(j; θ∗) < π(i; θ∗) (i.e., ad
aj is displayed before ai) then π(j; θ
∗
−i) = π(j; θ
∗), while if π(j; θ∗) > π(i; θ∗)
then π(j; θ∗−i) = π(j; θ
∗) − 1 (i.e., ad j is moved one slot upward), and
π(i; θ∗−i) = N . By recalling the definition of VCG payments p
∗
i in (3), in case
of position–dependent externalities we obtain the simplified formulation:
p∗i (vˆ) =

K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ∗)+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(qj vˆj; l)
]
if π(i; θ∗) ≤ K
0 otherwise
, (8)
which can be easily written as a per–slot payment as:
p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ) =

K+1∑
l=m+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l)
]
if m ≤ K
0 otherwise
. (9)
In the following sections we study the problem of designing incentive com-
patible mechanisms under different conditions of lack of information over the
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parameters {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K. In particular, in Section 4.1, we assume
that the actual values of {qi}i∈N are unknown by the auctioneer, while those
of {Λm}m∈K are known. In Section 4.2, we assume that the actual values
of {Λm}m∈K are unknown by the auctioneer, while those of qis are known.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we assume that the actual values of both {qi}i∈N and
{Λm}m∈K are unknown.
4.1. Unknown qualities {qi}i∈N
In this section we assume that the qualities of the ads ({qi}i∈N ) are un-
known, while {Λm}m∈K are known. We initially focus on DSIC mechanisms
and subsequently we discuss about mechanisms IC in expectation.
As in [12, 13], we formalize the problem as a multi–armed bandit prob-
lem and we study the properties of a learning mechanism where the explo-
ration and exploitation phases are separated, such that during the exploration
phase, we estimate the values of {qi}i∈N and during the exploitation phase
we use the estimated qualities {q˜i}i∈N to implement an IC mechanism. The
pseudo code of the algorithm A–VCG1 (Adaptive VCG1) is given in Fig. 1.
The details of the algorithm follow.
Exploration phase. The exploration phase takes τ ≥ N/K rounds.7 Dur-
ing this phase, the algorithm receives as input the parameters {Λm}m∈K and
collects data to estimate the quality of each ad. Unlike the single–slot case,
where we collect only one sample of click or no–click events per round, here
we can exploit the fact that each ad ai has a non–zero CTR whenever it is
allocated to a slot sm with m ≤ K. As a result, at each round of the explo-
ration phase, we collect K samples (click or no–click events), one from each
slot. Let θt (for t ≤ τ) be a sequence of (potentially arbitrary) allocations
independent from the advertisers’ bids. The set Bi = {t : π(i; θt) ≤ K, t ≤ τ}
contains all the time instants when ad ai is allocated to a valid slot, so that
|Bi| corresponds to the total number of (click/no–click) samples available for
ad ai. We denote by click
i
pi(i;θt)
(t) ∈ {0, 1} the click event at time t for ad
ai when displayed at slot π(i; θt). Depending on the slot in which the click
event happens, the ad ai has different CTRs, thus we weigh each click sample
by the probability of observation Λm related to the slot in which the ad was
7Notice that we need τ > N/K in order to guarantee that all the ads have at least one
sample to initialize the estimates q˜i.
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ, position–dependent pa-
rameters {Λm}m∈K
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (7)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clickipi(i;θt)(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki
pi(i;θt)
(t)
Λpi(i;θt)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (13)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜ defined in (14)
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment p˜ci defined in (16)
Figure 1: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG1 mechanism.
allocated. The estimated quality q˜i is computed as
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clickipi(i;θt)(t)
Λpi(i;θt)
, (10)
which is an unbiased estimate of qi (i.e., Eclick[q˜i] = qi, where Eclick is the
expectation w.r.t. the realization of the clicks). By applying the Hoeffding’s
inequality [34], we obtain a bound over the error of the estimated quality q˜i
for each ad i.
Proposition 1. For any ad i ∈ N
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Λ2pi(i;θt)
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
, (11)
with probability 1− δ (w.r.t. the click events).
During the exploration phase, at each round t = 1, . . . , τ , we adopt the
following sequence of allocations
θt = {〈s1, a(t mod N)+1〉, . . . , 〈sN , a(t+N−1 mod N)+1〉}, (12)
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obtaining |Bi| = ⌊Kτ/N⌋ for all the ads ai. Thus, given that ⌊Kτ/N⌋ ≥ τK2N ,
Equation (11) becomes
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
2N
δ
=: η. (13)
During this phase, in order to guarantee DSIC, the advertisers cannot be
charged with any payment, i.e. all the payments in rounds t ≤ τ are set
to 0. In fact, as shown in [13], any bid–dependent payment could be easily
manipulated by bidders with better estimates of the CTRs, thus obtaining a
non–truthful mechanism, whereas non–bid–dependent payments could make
the mechanism not to be IR and thus bidders may prefer not to participate
to the mechanism.
Exploitation phase. Once the exploration phase is concluded, an upper–
confidence bound over each quality is computed as q˜+i = q˜i + η and the
exploration phase is started and run for the remaining T − τ rounds. We
define the estimated social welfare as:
S˜W(θ, vˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Λpi(i;θ)q˜
+
i vˆi
and we define f˜ as the allocation function that displays ads in decreasing
order of q˜+i vˆi. f˜ returns the efficient allocation θ˜ on the basis of the estimated
qualities as:
θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
{S˜W(θ, vˆ)} (14)
Our mechanism adopts f˜ during all the steps of the exploitation phase. No-
tice that f˜ is an affine maximizer, given that
f˜(vˆ) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
Λpi(i;θ)q˜
+
i vˆi = argmax
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
q˜+i
qi
Λpi(i;θ)qivˆi = argmax
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
wiΛpi(i;θ)qivˆi
where each weight wi =
q˜+i
qi
is independent of the advertisers’ types vi. Hence,
we can apply the WVCG (weighted–VCG) payments (here denoted by p˜
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because based on estimated parameters) satisfying the DSIC property. In
particular, for any i, such that π(i; θ˜) ≤ K, we define the payment
p˜i(vˆ) =
1
wi
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l)
=
qi
q˜+i
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l). (15)
These payments cannot be computed by the auctioneer, since the actual
{qi}i∈N are unknown. However, we can resort to the pay–per–click payments
p˜ci(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
) =
1
Λpi(i;θ˜)q˜
+
i
( K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l)
)
I{clicki
pi(i;θ˜)
}.
(16)
which in expectation coincide with theWVCG payments p˜i(vˆ) = E[p˜
c
i(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
)].
Unlike the payments p˜i(vˆ), these payments can be computed simply relying
on the estimates q˜+i and on the knowledge of the probabilities Λm.
We can state the following.
Proposition 2. The A–VCG1 is DSIC, IR a posteriori, and WBB a pos-
teriori.
Proof. It trivially follows from the fact that the mechanism is a WVCG
mechanism and that the payments are pay–per–click. 
We now move to the analysis of the performance of A–VCG1 in terms of
regret the mechanism cumulates through T rounds.
Theorem 1. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T rounds with position–dependent cascade model with parame-
ters {Λm}Km=1 and accuracy η as defined in (13). For any parameter τ ∈
{0, . . . , T} and δ ∈ [0, 1], the A–VCG1 achieves a regret:
RT ≤ vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)(
2(T − τ)η + τ + δT
)
. (17)
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By setting the parameters to
δ = K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3
τ = 2
1
3K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3Λ
− 2
3
min
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 1
3
,
where Λmin = min
m∈K
Λm, Λmin > 0, then the regret is
RT ≤ 4 · 2 13vmaxΛ−
2
3
minK
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 13
(18)
We initially introduce some remarks about the above results, and subse-
quently discuss the sketch of the proof of the theorem.
Remark 1 (The bound). Up to numerical constants and logarithmic fac-
tors, the previous bound (18) is RT ≤ O˜(T 23K 23N 13 ). We first notice that
A–VCG1 is a no–regret algorithm since its per–round regret (RT/T ) de-
creases to 0 as T−
1
3 , thus implying that it asymptotically achieves the same
performance as the VCG. Furthermore, we notice that for K = 1 the bound
reduces (up to constants) to the single–slot case analyzed in [12]. Unlike
the standard bound for multi–armed bandit algorithms, the regret scales as
O˜(T
2
3 ) instead of O˜(T
1
2 ). As pointed out in [12] and [13] this is the un-
avoidable price the bandit algorithm has to pay to be DSIC. Finally, the
dependence of the regret on N is sub–linear (N
1
3 ) and therefore an increase
of the number of advertisers does not significantly worsen the regret. The
dependency on the number of slots K is similar: according to the bound (18)
the regret has a sublinear dependency O˜(K
2
3 ), meaning that whenever one
slot is added to the auction, the performance of the algorithm does not sig-
nificantly worsen. By analyzing the difference between the payments of the
VCG and A–VCG1, we notice that during the exploration phase the regret
is O(τK) (e.g., if all the ads allocated into the K slots are clicked at each ex-
plorative round), while during the exploitation phase the error in estimating
the qualities sum over all the K slots, thus suggesting a linear dependency
on K for this phase as well. Nonetheless, as K increases, the number of
samples available per ad increases as τK/N , thus improving the accuracy
of the quality estimates by O˜(K−
1
2 ) (see Proposition 1). As a result, as K
increases, the exploration phase can be shortened (the optimal τ actually
decreases as K−
1
3 ), thus reducing the regret during the exploration, and still
have accurate enough estimations to control the regret of the exploitation
phase.
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Remark 2 (Distribution–free bound). The bound derived in Theorem 1 is
a distribution–free (or worst–case) bound, since it holds for any set of adver-
tisers (i.e., for any {qi}i∈N and {vi}i∈N ). This generality comes at the price
that, as illustrated in other remarks and in the numerical simulations (see
Section 6), the bound could be inaccurate for some specific sets of advertis-
ers. On the other hand, distribution–dependent bounds (see e.g., the bounds
of UCB [33]), where q and v appear explicitly, would be more accurate in
predicting the behavior of the algorithm. Nonetheless, they could not be
used to optimize the parameters δ and τ , since they would then depend on
unknown quantities.
Remark 3 (Parameters). The choice of parameters τ and δ reported in
Theorem 1 is obtained by rough minimizing the upper–bound (17). Each
parameter can be computed by knowing the characteristics of the auction
(number of rounds T , number of slots K, number of ads N , and Λm). More-
over, since the values are obtained optimizing an upper–bound of the regret
and not directly the true global regret, these values can provide a good guess
for the parametrization, but there could be other values that better optimize
the regret. Thus, in practice, the regret could be optimized by searching the
space of the parameters around the values suggested in Theorem 1.
Remark 4 (IC in expectation). Two interesting problems we do not solve
in this paper once IC in expectation (over the click realizations and/or real-
izations of the random component of the mechanism) is adopted are whether
or not it is possible to avoid the separation of the exploration and exploita-
tion phases and whether it is possible to obtain a regret of O(T 1/2) as it is
possible in the case of K = 1 [16]. Any attempt we tried to extend the result
presented in [16] to the multi–slot case conducted us to a non–IC mecha-
nism. We briefly provide some examples of adaptation to our framework of
the two MAB presented [16]. None of these attempts provided a monotone
allocation function. We have tried to extend the UCB1 in different ways, e.g.
introducing N ·K estimators, one for each ad for each slot, or maintaining N
estimators weighting in different ways click obtained in different slots. The
second MAB algorithm, called NewCB, is based on the definition of a set of
active ads, the ones that can be displayed. We have considered extensions
with a single set for all the slots and with multiple sets, one for each slot,
without identifying monotone allocation algorithms.
(Comments to the proof). The proof uses relatively standard arguments
to bound the regret of the exploitation phase. As discussed in Remark 2,
the bound is distribution–free and some steps in the proof are conserva-
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tive upper–bounds on quantities that might be smaller for specific auctions.
For instance, the inverse dependency on the smallest cumulative discount
factor Λmin in the final bound could be a quite inaccurate upper–bound
on the quantity
∑K
m=1 1/Λ
2
m. In fact, the parameter τ itself could be op-
timized as a direct function of
∑K
m=1 1/Λ
2
m, thus obtaining a more accu-
rate tuning of the length of the exploration phase and a slightly tighter
bound (in terms of constant terms). Furthermore, we notice that the step
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; h)/max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi;m) ≤ 1 is likely to become less accurate as the dif-
ference between h and m increases (see Eq. B.3 in the proof). For instance, if
the qualities qi are drawn from a uniform distribution in (0, 1), as the number
of slots increases this quantity reduces as well (on average) thus making the
upper–bound by 1 less and less accurate. The accuracy of the proof and the
corresponding bound are further studied in the simulations in Section 6.
In a similar way, adopting the same mechanism as before, it is also possible
to derive an upper–bound over the global regret, when the regret, as in [16]
is computed over the social welfare of the allocation. In particular we obtain,
that, even in this case, A–VCG1 is a no–regret algorithm and RSWT ≤ O˜(T
2
3 ).
Theorem 2. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T rounds with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1 and η as defined in (13). For any parameter τ ∈ {0, . . . , T} and
δ ∈ [0, 1], the A–VCG1 achieves a regret:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK (2 (T − τ) η + τ + δT ) . (19)
By setting the parameters to
δ =
( √
2
Λmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3N
1
3T−
1
3
τ =
( √
2
Λmin
) 2
3
T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log 2
2
3Λ
2
3
minN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
,
where Λmin = min
m∈K
Λm, Λmin > 0, then the regret is
RSWT ≤ 4vmax
( √
2
Λmin
) 2
3
K
2
3N
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2
2
3Λ
2
3
minN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
(20)
Notice that using τ and δ defined in Theorem 1, the bound for RSWT is
O˜(T
2
3 ), even if the parameters are not optimal for this second framework.
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Input: Qualities parameters {qi}i∈N
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f∗ as prescribed by (7)
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment pci defined in (21)
Figure 2: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG2 mechanism.
4.2. Unknown {Λm}m∈K
We now focus on the situation when the auctioneer knows {qi}i∈N , while
{Λm}m∈K are unknown. By definition of cascade model, {Λm}m∈K are strictly
non–increasing in m. This dramatically simplifies the allocation problem
since the optimal allocation can be found without knowing the actual values
of {Λm}m∈K. Indeed, allocation θ∗ such that α(m; θ∗) ∈ argmax
i∈N
(qivˆi;m) is
optimal for all possible {Λm}m∈K. However, the lack of knowledge about
{Λm}m∈K makes the design of a truthful mechanism not straightforward be-
cause they appear in the calculation of the payments. Differently from what
we presented in the previous section, here we initially focus on IC in expec-
tation mechanisms, providing two mechanisms (the first is IC in expectation
over the click realizations and the second is IC in expectation over the real-
izations of the random component of the mechanism), and subsequently we
produce some considerations about DSIC mechanisms.
4.2.1. IC in expectation over the click realizations mechanism
In this case, we do not need any estimation of the parameters {Λm}m∈K
and therefore we do not resort to the multi–armed bandit framework and
the mechanism does not present separate phases. The pseudo code of the
algorithm A–VCG2 (Adaptive VCG2) is given in Fig. 2. On the basis of the
above considerations, we can adopt the allocatively efficient allocation func-
tion f ∗ as prescribed by (7) even if the mechanism does not know the actual
values of the parameters {Λm}m∈K. Nonetheless, the VCG payments defined
in (8) cannot be computed, since {Λm}m∈K not being known by the mecha-
nism. However, by resorting to execution–contingent payments (generalizing
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the pay–per–click approach8), we can impose computable payments that, in
expectation, are equal to (8). More precisely, the contingent payments are
computed given the bids vˆ and all click events over the slots and take the
form:
pci(vˆ, {clickjpi(j;θ∗)}Kj=1) (21)
=
∑
pi(i;θ∗)≤m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m ·
qα(m;θ∗
−i)
· vˆα(m;θ∗
−i)
qα(m;θ∗)
−
∑
pi(i;θ∗)<m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m · vˆα(m;θ∗)
Notice that the payment pci depends not only on the click of ad ai, but also
on the clicks of all the ads displayed in the slots below. In expectation, the
two terms of pci are:
Eclick
 ∑
pi(i;θ∗)≤m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m ·
qα(m;θ∗
−i)
· vˆα(m;θ∗
−i)
qα(m;θ∗)
 = ∑
pi(j;θ∗)≥pi(i;θ∗)
Λpi(j;θ∗
−i)
qj vˆj
Eclick
 ∑
pi(i;θ∗)<m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m · vˆα(m;θ∗)
 = ∑
pi(j;θ∗)>pi(i;θ∗)
Λpi(j;θ∗)qj vˆj
and therefore, in expectation, the payment equals to (8). Thus, we can state
the following.
Proposition 3. The A–VCG2 is IC, IR, WBB in expectation (over click
realizations) and AE.
Proof. It trivially follows from the fact that the allocation function is AE
and the payments in expectation equal the VCG payments. 
We discuss further properties of the mechanism in what follows.
Proposition 4. The A–VCG2 is not DSIC a posteriori (w.r.t. click real-
izations).
8In pay–per–click payments, an advertiser pays only once its ad is clicked; in our
execution–contingent payments, an advertiser pays also once the ads of other advertisers
are clicked.
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Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider an environment with 3
ads N = {a1, a2, a3} and 2 slots S = {s1, s2} s.t. q1 = 0.5, v1 = 4, q2 = 1,
v2 = 1, q3 = 1, v3 = 0.5, which correspond to expected values of 2, 1, and
0.5.
The optimal allocation θ∗ consists in allocating a1 in s1 and a2 in s2.
Consider a time t when both ad a1 and a2 are clicked, from Eq. 21 we have
that the payment of a2 is:
pc2 =
1
q2
q3v3 = 0.5
If ad a2 reports a value vˆ2 = 3, the optimal allocation is now a2 in s1 e a1 in
s2. In the case both a1 and a2 are clicked, the payment of a2 is:
pc2 =
1
q2
q1v1 +
1
q1
q3v3 − v1 = 2 + 1− 4 = −1
Given that, in both cases, the utility is u2 = v2−pc2, reporting a non–truthful
value is optimal. Thus, we can conclude that the mechanism is not DSIC.
Proposition 5. The A–VCG2 is IR a posteriori (w.r.t. click realizations).
Proof. Rename the ads {a1, . . . , aN} such that q1v1 ≥ q2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ qNvN .
We can write payments (21) as:
p˜ci =
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1 −
K∑
j=i+1
clickjjvj
Thus, the utility for advertiser ai is:
ui = click
j
jvi +
K∑
j=i+1
clickjjvj −
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
=
K∑
j=i
clickjjvj −
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
=
K∑
j=i
(
clickjjvj −
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
)
=
K∑
j=i
clickjjvj −
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
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=
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
(qjvj − qj+1vj+1).
Since
clickjj
qj
≥ 0 by definition and qjvj − qj+1vj+1 ≥ 0 because of the chosen
ordering of the ads, then the utility is always positive and we can conclude
the mechanism is IR a posteriori. 
Proposition 6. The A–VCG2 is not WBB a posteriori (w.r.t. click real-
izations).
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider an environment with 3
ads N = {a1, a2, a3} and 2 slots S = {s1, s2} s.t. q1 = 1, v1 = 2, q2 = 0.5,
v2 = 1, q3 = 1, v3 = ǫ, where ǫ > 0 is a small number.
The optimal allocation θ∗ consists in allocating a1 in s1 e a2 in s2. Con-
sider a time instant t when both ad a1 and a2 are clicked, their payments
are:
pc1 =
1
q1
q2v2 +
1
q2
q3v3 − v2 = 0.5 + 2ǫ− 1 = 2ǫ− 0.5 < 0
pc2 =
1
q2
q3v3 = 2ǫ
Thus,
∑3
i=1 p
c
i = 4ǫ− 0.5 < 0, and we can conclude that the mechanism
is not WBB a posteriori. 
Now we state the following theorem, whose proof is straightforward.
Theorem 3. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1.
The A–VCG2 achieves an expected regret RT = 0.
An important property of this mechanism is that the expected payments are
exactly the VCG payments for the optimal allocation when all the parameters
are known. Moreover, the absence of an exploration phase allows us to obtain
an instantaneous expected regret of zero and, thus, the cumulative regret over
the T rounds of auction RT = 0. Similar considerations can be applied to
the study of the regret over the social welfare, obtaining the following.
Corollary 1. The A–VCG2 has an expected regret over the social welfare of
zero.
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f∗′ as prescribed by Algorithm 1
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment pB,∗,xi defined in (23)
Figure 3: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG2′ mechanism.
4.2.2. IC in expectation over random component realizations mechanism
As for the previous mechanism, here we have only the exploitation phase.
Differently from the previous mechanism, the mechanism has a random com-
ponent as proposed in [16]. The mechanism, called A–VCG2′ is reported in
Fig. 3. It is obtained applying the approach described in [16] to allocation
function f ∗.
Since f ∗ is monotonic (see Appendix A) and the problem is with single
parameter and linear utilities, payments assuring DSIC can be written as [27]:
p∗i (vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu, (22)
which coincide with the VCG payments defined in 3 (hence the use of the
same notation p∗i ). This is justified by the fact that when a mechanism is AE,
IR and WBB the only payments that lead to a DSIC mechanism are the VCG
payments with Clacke’s pivot [35], thus (22) must coincide.However, these
payments are not directly computable, because parameters {Λm}m∈K in the
integral are unknown (and, as in the case discussed in Section 4.2.1, we can-
not replace them by empirical estimates). We could obtain these payments
in expectation by using execution–contingent payments associated with non–
optimal allocations where the report vˆi is modified between 0 and the actual
value. This can be obtained by resorting to the approach proposed in [16].
More precisely, the approach proposed in [16] takes in input a generic alloca-
tion function f and introduces a randomized component into it, producing
a new allocation function that we denote by f ′. This technique, at the cost
of reducing the efficiency of f , allows the computation of the allocation and
the payments at the same time even when payments described in [27] cannot
be computed directly.
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We apply the approach proposed in [16] to our f ∗ obtaining a new allo-
cation function f ∗
′
. With f ∗
′
, the advertisers’ reported values {vˆi}i∈N are
modified, each with a (small) probability µ. The (potentially) modified val-
ues are then used to compute the allocation (using f ∗) and the payments.
More precisely, with a probability of (1−µ)N , f ∗′ returns the same allocation
f ∗ would return, while it does not with a probability of 1 − (1 − µ)N . The
reported values {vˆi}i∈N are modified through the canonical self–resampling
procedure (cSRP) described in [16] that generates two samples: xi(vˆi, ωi) and
yi(vˆi, ωi), where ωi is the random seed. We sketch the result of cSRP where
the function ‘rec’ is defined in [16]:
(xi, yi) = cSRP (vˆi) =
{
(vˆi, vˆi) w.p. 1− µ
(vˆ′′i , vˆ
′
i) otherwise
,
where vˆ′i ∼ U([0, vˆi]) and vˆ′′i = rec(vˆ′i).
Algorithm 1 f ∗
′
(vˆ)
1: for all ai ∈ N do
2: (xi, yi) = cSRP (vˆi)
3: x = (x1, . . . , xN )
4: θ = f∗(x)
Algorithm 1 shows how f ∗
′
works when the original allocation function
is f ∗. The reported values {vˆi}i∈N are perturbed through the canonical self–
resampling procedure (Step 2) and then it returns the allocation found by
applying the original allocation function f ∗ to the new values x (Step 4).
Finally, the payments are computed as
pB,∗,ci (x, click
i
pi(i;f∗(x))) =
{
pB,∗i (x,y;vˆ)
Λpi(i;f∗(x))qi
if clickipi(i;f∗(x)) = 1
0 otherwise
=
vˆi −
{
1
µ
vˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise,
if clickipi(i;f∗(x)) = 1
0 otherwise
(23)
where
pB,∗i (x,y; vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(x))qivˆi −
{
1
µ
Λpi(i;f∗(x))qivˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise,
(24)
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y = (y1, . . . , yN) and the expected value of payments (23) w.r.t. the random-
ization of the mechanism are the payments [27] for the randomized allocation
function f ∗
′
. The result presented in [16] assures that the resulting mecha-
nism is IC in expectation over the realizations of the random component and
a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations.
We state the following results on the properties of the above mechanism.
Theorem 4. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1.
The A–VCG2 ′ achieves an expected regret RT ≤ 2K2µvmaxT .
Adopting µ = 1
Tα
with α > 1 then RT → 0, but, as we will show in
Section 6, the smaller µ the larger the variance of the payments. We provide
a similar result for the regret over the social welfare.
Theorem 5. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1.
The A–VCG2 ′ achieves an expected regret RSWT ≤ K2µvmaxT .
4.2.3. Considerations about DSIC mechanisms
At the cost of worsening the regret, one may wonder whether there exists
some no–regret DSIC mechanism. In what follows, resorting to the same
arguments used in [21], we show that the answer to such question is negative.
Theorem 6. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1
whose value are unknown. Any online learning DSIC a posteriori (w.r.t.
click realizations) mechanism achieves an expected regret RT = Θ(T ).
Proof. (sketch) Basically, the A–VCG2 mechanism is only IC in expec-
tation (and not DSIC) because it adopts execution–contingent payments
in which the payment of advertiser ai depends also on the clicks over ads
different from ai. The above payment technique—i.e., payments reported
in (21)—is necessary to obtain in expectation the values SW(θ∗−i, vˆ−i) and
SW−i(θ∗, vˆ), since parameters {Λm}m∈K are not known. In order to have
DSIC a posteriori (i.e., truthful for any realization of the clicks), we need
payments pi that are deterministic w.r.t. the clicks over other ads different
from ai (i.e., pay–per–click payments are needed).
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We notice that even if Λm have been estimated (e.g., in an exploitation
phase), we cannot have payments leading to DSIC. Indeed, with estimates
Λ˜m, the allocation function maximizing S˜W (computed with Λ˜m) is not an
affine maximizer and therefore the adoption of WVCG mechanism would
not guarantee DSIC. As a result, only mechanisms with payments defined
as in [27] can be used. However, these payments, if computed exactly (and
not estimated in expectation), require the knowledge about the actual Λm
related to each slot sm in which an ad can be allocated for each report vˆ ≤ v.
To prove the theorem, we provide a characterization of DSIC mechanisms.
Exactly, we need a monotonic allocation function and the payments defined
in [27]. These payments, as said above, require the knowledge about the
actual Λm related to the slot sm in which an ad can be allocated for each
report vˆ ≤ v. Thus we have two possibilities:
• In the first case, an ad can be allocated only in one slot and its report
determines only whether it is displayed or not. That is, the ads are
partitioned and each partition is associated with a slot and the ad with
the largest expected valuation is chosen at each slot independently.
This case is equivalent to multiple separate–single slot auctions and
therefore each auction is DSIC as shown in [12]. However, as shown
in [21], this mechanism would have a regret Θ(T ).
• In the second case, an ad can be allocated in more than one slot on the
basis of its report. In this case, to compute the payments, it would be
necessary to know the exact CTRs of the ad for each possible slot, but
this is possible only in expectation either by using the above execution–
contingent as we do in Section 4.2.1 or by generating non–optimal al-
location as we do in Section 4.2.2.
Thus, in order to have DSIC, we need to adopt the class of mechanisms
described in the first case, obtaining RT = Θ(T ). 
4.3. Unknown {Λm}m∈K and {qi}i∈N
In this section we study the situation in which both {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K
are unknown. From the results discussed in the previous section, we know
that adopting DSIC as solution concept we would obtain RT = Θ(T ). Thus,
we focus only on IC in expectation.
First of all, we remark that the mechanisms presented in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 cannot be adopted here, but the study of a new mechanism is re-
quired. The mechanism we design is given by the combination of A–VCG1
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (12)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clicki1(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi click
i
1(t)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (25)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜ ′ as prescribed by Algorithm 1
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment p˜B,ci defined in (26)
Figure 4: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG3 mechanism.
and A–VCG2′. The pseudo code of the algorithm A–VCG3 (Adaptive VCG3)
is given in Fig. 4. As in the case in which only {qi}i∈N are unknown, we
formalize the problem as a multi–armed bandit where the exploration and
exploitation phases are separate and where, during the exploration phase, we
estimate the values of {qi}i∈N . Details of the algorithm follow.
Exploration phase. During the first τ rounds of the auction, estimates of
{qi}i∈N are computed. We use the same exploration policy of Section 4.1,
but the estimations are computed just using samples from the first slot, since
Λm with m > 1 are unknown.
9 Define Bi = {t : π(i; θt) = 1, t ≤ τ} the set
of rounds t ≤ τ where ai is displayed in the first slot, the number of samples
collected for ai is |Bi| = ⌊ τN ⌋ ≥ τ2N . The estimated value of qi is computed
as:
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki1(t).
9In the following, we report some considerations about the case in which also the
samples from the slots below the first are considered.
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such that q˜i is an unbiased estimate of qi (i.e., Eclick[q˜i] = qi, where Eclick is in
expectation w.r.t. the realization of the clicks). By applying the Hoeffding’s
inequality we obtain an upper bound over the error of the estimated quality
q˜i for each ad ai.
Proposition 7. For any ad {ai}i∈N
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√
1
2|Bi| log
2N
δ
≤
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
=: η, (25)
with probability 1− δ (w.r.t. the click events).
After the exploration phase, an upper–confidence bound over each quality is
computed as q˜+i = q˜i + η.
Exploitation phase. We first focus on the allocation function. During the
exploitation phase we want to use an allocation θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) maximizing the es-
timated social welfare with estimated {q˜+i }i∈N and the parameters {Λm}m∈K.
Since the actual parameters {Λm}m∈K are monotonically non–increasing we
can use an allocation {〈sm, aα(m;θ˜)〉}m∈K′ , where
α(m; θ˜) ∈ argmax
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) = argmax
i∈N
(q˜+i Λmvˆi;m).
We now focus on payments. Allocation function f˜ is an affine maximizer
(due to weights depending on q˜i as in Section 4.1), but WVCG payments
cannot be computed given that parameters {Λm}m∈K are unknown. Neither
the adoption of execution–contingent payments, like in (21), is allowed, given
that qi is unknown and only estimates q˜i are available.
Thus, we resort to implicit payments as in Section 4.2.2. More precisely,
we use the same exploitation phase we used in Section 4.2.2 except that we
adopt f˜ in place of f ∗. In this case, we have that the per–click payments are:
p˜B,ci (x, click
i
pi(i;f˜(x))
) =
{
p˜Bi (x,y;vˆ)
Λpi(i;f˜(x))qi
if clicki
pi(i;f˜(x))
= 1
0 otherwise
=vˆi −
{
1
µ
vˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise,
if clicki
pi(i;f˜(x))
= 1
0 otherwise
(26)
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where
p˜Bi (x,y; vˆ) = Λpi(i;f˜(x))qivˆi −
{
1
µ
Λpi(i;f˜(x))qivˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise,
(27)
We can state the following.
Theorem 7. The A–VCG3 is IC and WBB in expectation (over the realiza-
tions of the random component of the mechanism) and IR a posteriori (w.r.t.
the random component of the mechanism). These properties hold a posteriori
w.r.t. the click realizations.
Proof. The proof of IC in expectation and WBB in expectation easily fol-
lows from the definition of the adopted mechanism as discussed in [16]. The
proof of IR a posteriori is similar to the proof of Proposition 5. The fact that
the properties hold a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations follows from [16].

Now we want to analyze the performance of the mechanism in terms
of regret cumulated through T rounds. Notice that in this case we have
to focus on two different potential sources of regret: the adoption of a sub–
optimal (randomized) allocation function and the estimation of the unknown
parameters.
Theorem 8. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1.
For any parameter τ and δ, the A–VCG3 achieves a regret
RT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ) (2η + 2µN) + τ + δT ]
By setting the parameters to
• µ = N− 23T− 13 . µ is always ≤ 1
• δ = N 13T− 13 . δ ≤ 1, thus T ≥ N
• τ = T 23N 13 (log 2N
δ
) 1
3
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then the regret is
RT ≤ 6vmaxKT 23N 13
(
log
(
2N
2
3T
1
3
)) 13
(28)
Remark 1 (The bound). Up to numerical constants and logarithmic fac-
tors, the previous bound is RT ≤ O˜(T 23KN 13 ). We first notice we match the
lowest possible complexity for the parameter T when exploration and exploit-
ation phases are separate. Moreover observe that the proposed mechanism
is a no–regret algorithm, thus asymptotically it achieves the same perfor-
mances of VGC (when all the parameter are known), since its per–round
regret (RT/T ) decreases to 0 as T
− 1
3 . We can observe that, with respect
to the case of Section 4.1, the dependence of the cumulative regret in the
parameter K is augmented by a factor K
1
3 . The reason resides in the explo-
ration phase, indeed, in this last case, we cannot take advantage of all data
we can collect, given that we estimate the qualities only on the basis of their
visualization in the first slot. Instead, the dependency on N is the same of
the one in the case studied in Section 4.1.
Remark 2 (Non–separate phases and O(T 1/2)). The questions whether or
not it is possible to avoid the separation of the exploration and exploitation
phases preserving IC in expectation (in some form) and whether or not it
is possible to obtain a regret of O(T 1/2) are open. We conjecture that, if
it is possible to have RT = O(T
1/2) when only {qi}i∈N are unknown, then
it is possible to have RT = O(T
1/2) also when {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K are
unknown. However, such a problem is still open.
Remark 3 (Using samples from multiple slots). The question whether it is
possible to exploit the samples from the slots below the first one to improve
the accuracy of the estimates and to reduce the length of the exploration
phase is open. The critical issue here is that the samples from those slots are
about the product of two random variables, i.e., Λs and qi, and it is not trivial
to find a method to use these samples to improve the esteems. However, in
the case it is possible to exploit these samples, we would obtain a reduction of
the regret bound of at most K1/3, given that the dependency from K cannot
be better than in the case discussed in Section 4.1 (i.e., O(K
2
3 )).
A–VCG3 allows also the identification of an upper–bound over the re-
gret on the social welfare. The derivation is not straightforward with respect
to the bound over the regret on the payments, but, using the value of the
parameters identified in Theorem 8, the bound is O˜(T
2
3 ). Optimising the pa-
rameters w.r.t. to the regret over the social welfare, we obtain the following.
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Theorem 9. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T rounds, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1.
For any parameter τ and δ, the A–VCG3 achieves a regret
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ)(2η +Nµ) + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+Nµ
)
+ τ + δT
]
By setting the parameters to
µ = K−1N
1
3T−
1
3 . µ ≤ 1 when T > N
K3
δ = N
1
3T−
1
3
τ = T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
then the regret is
RSWT ≤ 5 · vmaxKN
1
3T
2
3
(
logN
2
3T
1
3
) 1
3
.
5. Learning with Position– and Ad–Dependent Externalities
In this section we deal with the general model where both position– and
ad–dependent externalities are present, as formalized in (1), and we provide
several partial results. In Section 5.1, we analyze the problem of designing
a DSIC mechanism when only the qualities of the ads are unknown. In
Section 5.2 we highlight some problems that rise when also other parameters
are uncertain.
5.1. Unknown quality
In this section we analyze the problem where the only unknown param-
eters are the qualities {qi}i∈N of the ads and the externality model includes
position– and ad–dependent externalities. As we do in Section 4.1, we focus
on DSIC mechanisms and we leave open the question whether better bounds
over the regret can be found by employing IC in expectation. Therefore
we study MAB algorithms that separate the exploration and exploitation
phases. The structure of the mechanism we propose, called PAD–A–VCG,
is similar to the A–VCG1 and is reported in Fig. 5.
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ, position–dependent pa-
rameters {Γm}m∈K
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (12)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clickipi(i;θt)(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki
pi(i;θt)
(t)
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (29)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment p˜ci defined in (30)
Figure 5: Pseudo–code for the PAD–A–VCG mechanism.
Exploration phase.. During the exploration phase with length τ ≤ T steps
we collect K samples of click or no–click events. Given a generic exploration
policy {θt}0≤t≤τ , the estimate quality q˜i is computed as:
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clickipi(i;θt)(t)
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
,
where we identify the set Bi = {t : π(i; θt) ≤ K, t ≤ τ}.
The explorative allocations θt have an impact on the discount Γm(θt) and
thus a variation of Proposition 1 holds in which (11) is substituted by:
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
2
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
.
For each exploration policy such that |Bi| = ⌊Kτ/N⌋ ∀i ∈ N , e.g. policy
(12), we redefine η as
|qi − q˜i| ≤ 1
Γmin
√
N
2Kτ
log
N
δ
:= η, (29)
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where Γmin = min
θ∈Θ,m∈K
{Γm(θ)}. We define the upper–confidence bound q˜+i =
q˜i + η. During the exploration phase, in order to preserve the DSIC prop-
erty, the allocations {θt}0≤t≤τ do not depend on the reported values of the
advertisers and no payments are imposed to the advertisers.
Exploitation phase. We define the estimated social welfare as
S˜W(θ, vˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Γpi(i;θ)(θ)q˜
+
i vˆi =
K∑
m=1
Γm(θ)q˜
+
α(m;θ)vˆα(m;θ).
We denote by θ˜ the allocation maximizing S˜W(f(vˆ), vˆ) and by f˜ the alloca-
tion function returning θ˜:
θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
S˜W(θ, vˆ).
Once the exploration phase is over, the ads are allocated on the basis of f˜ .
Since f˜ is an affine maximizer, the mechanism can impose WVCG payments
to the advertisers satisfying the DSIC property. In a pay–per–click fashion,
if ad ai is clicked, the advertiser is charged
p˜ci(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
) =
S˜W(θ˜−i)− S˜W−i(θ˜)
Γpi(i;θ˜)(θ˜)q˜
+
i
(30)
which corresponds, in expectation, to the WVCG payment p˜i = p˜
c
iΓpi(i;θ˜)(θ˜)qi.
We are interested in bounding the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue due to
PAD–A–VCG compared to the auctioneer’s revenue of the VCG mechanism
when all the parameters are known.
Theorem 10. Let us consider an auction with N advs, K slots, and T
rounds. The auction has position/ad–dependent externalities and cumulative
discount factors {Γm(θ)}Km=1 and η defined as in (29). For any parameter
τ ∈ {0, . . . , T} and δ ∈ [0, 1], the PAD–A–VCG achieves a regret:
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
3
√
2n
Γminqmin
√
N
Kτ
log
N
δ
)
+ τ + δT
]
, (31)
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where qmin = mini∈N qi. By setting the parameters to
δ = K
1
3N
1
3
(
5√
2Γmin
) 2
3
T−
1
3 ,
τ =
(
5√
2Γmin
) 2
3
K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
,
the regret is
RT ≤ 4vmaxK 43T 23N 13 5
2
3
2
1
3Γ
2
3
minqmin
(
log
2
1
3Γ
2
3
minN
2
3T
1
3
K
1
35
2
3
) 1
3
. (32)
Remark 1 (Differences w.r.t. position–dependent externalities.) Up to
constants and logarithmic factors, the previous distribution–free bound is
RT ≤ O˜(T 23N 13K 43 ).10 We first notice that moving from position– to position/ad–
dependent externalities does not change the dependency of the regret on both
the number of rounds T and the number of ads N . Moreover, the per–round
regret still decreases to 0 as T increases. The main difference w.r.t. the
bound in Theorem 1 is in the dependency on K and on the smallest quality
qmin. We believe that the augmented dependence in K is mostly due to an in-
trinsic difficulty of the position/ad–dependent externalities. The intuition is
that now, in the computation of the payment for each ad ai, the errors in the
quality estimates cumulate through the slots (unlike the position–dependent
case where they are scaled by Γk−Γk+1). This cumulated error should impact
only on a portion of the ads (i.e., those which are actually impressed accord-
ing to the optimal and the estimated optimal allocations) whose cardinality
can be upper–bounded by 2K. Thus we observe that the bound shows a
super–linear dependency in the number of slots. The other main difference is
that now the regret has an inverse dependency on the smallest quality qmin.
Inspecting the proof, this dependency appears because the error of a quality
estimation for an ad ai might be amplified by the inverse of the quality itself
1
qi
. As discussed in Remark 2 of Theorem 1, this dependency might follow
from that fact the we have a distribution–free bound. We investigate whether
10We notice that in [36] the authors provide a bound O(T
2
3NK
2
3 ) that does not match
with their numerical simulations and thus they conjecture that the actual bound is
O(T
2
3N
1
3K
4
3 ). Here we show that the conjecture is correct.
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this dependency is an artifact of the proof or it is intrinsic in the algorithm
in the numerical simulations reported in Section 6.
Remark 2 (Optimization of the parameter τ). We are considering an
environment where {qi}i∈N are unknown, but if, at least, a guess about the
value of qmin is available, it could be used to better tune τ by multiplying it
by (qmin)
− 2
3 , thus reducing the regret from O˜((qmin)
−1) to O˜((qmin)−
2
3 ).
Remark 3 (Externalities–dependent bound). We notice that the above
bound does not reduce to the bound (18) in which only position–dependent
externalities are present even disregarding the constant terms. Indeed, the
dependency on K is different in the two bounds: in (18) we have K
2
3 while in
(32) we haveK
4
3 . This means that bound (32) over–estimates the dependency
on K whenever the auction has position–dependent externalities. It is an in-
teresting open question whether it is possible to derive an auction–dependent
bound where the specific values of the discount factors γk(f) explicitly appear
in the bound and that it reduces to (18) for position–dependent externalities.
(Comment to the proof). While the proof of Thm. 1 could exploit the
specific definition of the payments for position–dependent slots and it is a
fairly standard extension of [12], in this case the proof is more complicated
because of the dependency of the discount factors on the actual allocations
and decomposes the regret of the exploitation phase in components due to
the different allocations (f˜ instead of f ∗) and the different qualities as well
(q˜+ instead of q).
Using the mechanism described before, it is possible to derive an upper–
bound over the global regret, when the regret, as in [16], is computed over
the social welfare of the allocation. We obtain the same dependence over T ,
as for the regret on the payment. Thus RSWT ≤ O˜(T
2
3 ). In particular notice
that PAD–A–VCG is a zero–regret algorithm.
Theorem 11. Let us consider an auction with N advs, K slots, and T
rounds. The auction has position/ad–dependent externalities and cumulative
discount factors {Γm(θ)}Km=1 and η defined as in (29). For any parameter
τ ∈ {0, . . . , T} and δ ∈ [0, 1], the PAD–A–VCG achieves a regret:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ) 2
Γmin
√
N
2Kτ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
, (33)
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By setting the parameters to
δ =
( √
2
Γmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3N
1
3T−
1
3
τ =
( √
2
Γmin
) 2
3
T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
,
the regret is
RSWT ≤ 4vmax
( √
2
Γmin
) 2
3
K
2
3N
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2
2
3Γ
− 2
3
minN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
. (34)
Notice that using τ and δ defined in Theorem 10, the bound for RSWT is
O˜(T
2
3 ), even if the parameters are not optimal for this second framework.
5.2. Further extensions
In this section we provide a negative, in terms of regret, result under DSIC
truthfulness when the parameter γi,m depends only on the ad i (as in [17],
we denote it by ci) and this parameter is the only uncertain parameter.
We focus on the exploitation phase, supposing the exploration phase has
produced the estimates {c˜+i }i∈N for the continuation probabilities {ci}i∈N .
The allocation function f presented in [17] is able to compute the optimal
allocation when {ci}i∈N values are known, but it is not an affine maximizer
when applied to the estimated values {c˜+i }i∈N . Indeed, we call this allocation
function f˜ :
f˜(vˆ) ∈ argmax
θ∈Θ
K∑
m=1
qα(m;θ)vˆα(m;θ)
m−1∏
h=1
c˜+α(h;θ). (35)
In this case, a weight depending only on a single ad cannot be isolated.
Furthermore, we show also that this allocation function is not monotonic.
Proposition 8. The allocation function f˜ is not monotonic.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample.Consider an environment with 3
ads and 2 slots such that:
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ad vi c˜
+
i ci
a1 0.85 1 0.89
a2 1 0.9 0.9
a3 1.4 0 0
and qi = 1 ∀i ∈ N . The optimal allocation θ˜ found by f˜ when agents declare
their true values v is: ad a2 is allocated in the first slot and a3 in the second
one. We have CTRa3(θ˜) = 0.9.
If advertiser a3 reports a larger value: vˆ3 = 1.6, in the allocation θˆ found
by f˜(vˆ3,v−3), ad a1 is displayed into the first slot and a3 into the second one.
In this case CTRa3(θˆ) = 0.89 < CTRa3(θ˜), thus the allocation function f˜ is
not monotonic. 
On the basis of the above result, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 12. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and T
rounds, with ad–dependent cascade model with parameters {ci}Ni=1 whose value
are unknown. Any online learning DSIC mechanism achieves an expected
regret RSWT = Θ(T ) over the social welfare.
Proof. Call f(vˆ|c) the allocation function maximizing the social welfare
given parameters c. As shown above, f(vˆ|c˜) cannot be adopted in the ex-
ploitation phase, the mechanism would not be DSIC otherwise. However,
it can be easily observed that a necessary condition to have a no–regret al-
gorithm is that the allocation function used in the exploitation phase, say
g(vˆ|c˜), is such that g(vˆ|c) = f(vˆ|c) for every vˆ and c (that is, they always re-
turn the same allocation) given that c˜ are consistent estimates and c˜→ c as
T → +∞. Otherwise, since allocations are finite and the difference between
the values of the allocations is generically strictly positive, the algorithm
would suffer from a strictly positive regret when T → +∞ and therefore it
would not be a no–regret mechanism. However, any such a g would not be
monotonic and therefore it cannot be adopted in a DSIC mechanism. As a
result, any online learning DSIC mechanism is not a no–regret mechanism.
To complete the proof, we need to provide a mechanism with regret Θ(T ).
Such a mechanism can be easily obtained by partitioning ads in groups such
that in each group the ads compete only for a single slot. Therefore, each ad
can appear in only one slot. 
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The above result shows that no approach similar to the approach de-
scribed in [16] can be adopted even for IC in expectation. Indeed, the ap-
proach described in [16] requires in input a monotonic allocation function.
This would suggest a negative result in terms of regret also when IC in ex-
pectation. However, in this paper we leave the study of this case open.
Finally, we provide a result on the regret over the auctioneer’s revenue,
whose proof is straightforward given that the (W)VCG cannot be adopted
due to the above result and therefore the regret over the payments cannot
go to zero as T goes to ∞.
Theorem 13. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and T
rounds, with ad–dependent cascade model with parameters {ci}Ni=1 whose value
are unknown. Any online learning DSIC mechanism achieves an expected
regret over the auctioneer’s revenue RT = Θ(T ).
6. Numerical Simulations
In this section we report numerical simulations to validate the theoretical
bounds over the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue presented in the previous
sections.11 In particular, we analyze the accuracy with which our bounds
predict the dependency of the regret on the main parameters of the auctions
such as T , N , K, and qmin. All the simulations share the way the ads
are generated. The qualities {qi}N are drawn from a uniform distribution
in [0.01, 0.1], while the values {vi}N are randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0, 1] (vmax = 1). Since the main objective is to test the
accuracy of the bounds, we report the relative regret
RT =
RT
B(T,K,N, qmin,Γmin)
,
where B(T,K,N, qmin,Γmin) is the value of the bound for the specific set-
ting (i.e., (18) and (28) for position–dependent, and (32) for position/ad–
dependent externalities). We analyze the accuracy of the bound w.r.t. each
specific parameter, changing only its value and keeping the values of all the
11The bounds over the regret of the social welfare present a structure similar to those
over the auctioneer’s revenue and their empirical analysis is omitted, providing similar
results.
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Figure 6: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {qi}i∈N . Dependency of the
relative regret on T , N .
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Figure 7: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {qi}i∈N . Dependency of the
relative regret on K for two different choice of the the qualities q.
others fixed. We expect the relative regret to be always smaller than 1, in-
deed we expect B to be an actual upper–bound on the real regret RT . All
the results presented in the following sections have been obtained by setting
τ and δ as suggested by the bounds derived in the previous sections and,
where it is not differently specified, by averaging over 100 independent runs.
6.1. Position–Dependent Externalities
6.1.1. Unknown {qi}i∈N
First of all we analyze the accuracy of the bound provided in Section 4.1,
where the model presents only position–dependent externalities and the qual-
ities of the ads are unknown. We design the simulations such that λm = λ
for every m with Λ1 = 1 and ΛK = 0.8 (i.e., λ =
K−1
√
0.8). Thus, Λmin = 0.8
in all the experiments.
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In Fig. 6 we analyze the accuracy of the bound w.r.t. the parameters T
and N . All the three curves in the left plot are completely flat (except for
white noise) showing that the value of the relative regret RT for different
values of K and N not change as T increases. This suggests that the bound
in Theorem 1 effectively predicts the dependency of the regret RT w.r.t. the
number of rounds T of the auction as O˜(T 2/3). The right plot represents the
dependency of the relative regret RT on the number of ads N . In this case
we notice that it is relatively accurate as N increases but there is a transitory
effect for smaller values of N where the regret grows faster than predicted by
the bound (although B(T,K,N, qmin,Λmin) is still an upper–bound to RT ).
Finally, the left plot of Fig. 7 suggests that the dependency onK in the bound
of Theorem 1 is over–estimated, since the relative regret RT decreases as K
increases. As discussed in the comment to the proof in Section 4 this might
be explained by the over–estimation of the term
maxi(q˜
+
i vˆi;l)
maxi(q˜
+
i vˆi;k)
in the proof.
In fact, this term is likely to decrease as K increases. In order to validate
this intuition, we have identified some instances for which the bound seems
to accurately predict the dependency on K. For these instances q1 = 0.1,
q2 = 0.095, and qi = 0.09 for every 2 < i ≤ K. As a result, the ratio between
the qualities qi is fixed (on average) and does not change with K. The right
plot of Fig. 7 shows that, with these values of qi, the ratio RT is constant
for different values of N , implying that in this case the bound accurately
predicts the behavior of RT . In fact, as commented in Theoerm 1, we derive
distribution–independent bounds where the qualities qi do not appear in the
bound. As a result, RT should be intended as a worst case w.r.t. all the
possible configurations of qualities and the externalities.
6.1.2. Unknown {Λm}m∈K
We now investigate the accuracy of the bound derived for algorithm A–
VCG2′ presented in Section 4.2.2. We used several probability distributions
to generate the values of {λm}m∈K. We observed that, when they are drawn
uniformly from the interval [0.98, 1.00], the numerical simulations confirm
our bound (as we show below), whereas the bound seems to overestimate the
dependences over K and µ when the support of the probability distribution
is larger (i.e., [< 0.98, 1.00]); we do not report any plot for this second case.
The left plot of Figure 8 shows the dependence of the ratio RT w.r.t. T
when µ = 0.01. Despite the noise, the ratio seems not to be affected by the
variation of T , confirming our bound. In the right plot of Figure 8, the ratio
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Figure 8: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {Λm}m∈K. Dependency of the
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Figure 9: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {Λm}m∈K. Dependency of the
relative regret on µ. Variance of the revenue of the auctioneer
follows the same behaviour as K varies when T = 105 and µ = 0.01 except
that the bound seems to overestimate the dependence when K assumes small
values (as it happens in practice). In the left plot of Figure 9, the ratio RT
seems to be constant as µ varies when T = 105.
We conclude our analysis studying the variance of the payments as µ
varies. The bound over RT , provided in Section 4.2.2, suggests to choose
a µ → 0 in order to reduce the regret. Nonetheless, the regret bounds are
obtained in expectation w.r.t. all the sources of randomization (including
the mechanism) and do not consider the possible deviations. Thus in the
right plot of Figure 9 we investigate the variance of the payments. In fact,
The variance is excessively high for small values of µ, making the adoption of
these value inappropriate. Thus, the choice of µ should consider both these
two dimensions of the problem: the regret and the variance of the payments.
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6.1.3. Unknown {Λm}m∈K and {qi}i∈N
In this section we analyze the bound provided in Section 4.3 for position–
dependent auctions where both the prominences and the qualities are un-
known. For these simulations we generate {λm}m∈K samples from a uniform
distribution over [0.5, 1]. In the simulations we adopted the values of τ , δ
and µ derived for the bound. In particular, in order to balance the increase
of variance of the payments when µ decreases, the number of rounds is not
constant, but it changes as a function of µ, i.e. 1000
µ
. This means that, in
expectation, the bid of a generic ad ai is modified 1000 times over the number
of the rounds.
In the plots of Fig. 10, we show that the bound (28) accurately predicts
the dependence of the regret w.r.t. the parameters T and N . Indeed, except
for the white noise due to the high variance of the payments based on the
cSRP, the two plots shows that fixing the other parameters, the ratio RT is
constant as T and N increase, respectively.
The plot in Fig. 11 represents the dependency of the relative regret w.r.t.
the parameter K. We can deduce that the bound RT over–estimate the
dependency onK for small values of the parameters, while, with larger values,
the bound accurately predicts the behavior, the curves being flat.
6.2. Position/Ad–Dependent Externalities
In this section we analyze the bound provided in Section 5.1 for auctions
with position–dependent and ad–dependent externalities where both only the
qualities are unknown.
In the bound provided in Theorem 10 the regret RT presents a linear
dependency on N and an inverse dependency on the smallest quality qmin.
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The relative regret RT is now defined as RT/B where B is bound (32). In
the left plot of Fig. 12 we report RT as T increases. As it can be noticed, the
bound accurately predicts the behavior of the regret w.r.t. T as in the case
of position–dependent externalities. In the right plot of Fig. 12 we report
RT as we change qmin. According to the bound in (32) the regret should
decrease as qmin increases (i.e., RT ≤ O˜(q−1min)) but it is clear from the plot
that RT has a much smaller dependency on qmin, if any
12. Finally, we study
the dependency on N (Figure 13). In this case RT slightly increases and then
it tends to flat as N increases. This result suggests that the, theoretically
12From this experiment is not clear whether RT = O˜(qmin), thus implying that RT
does not depend on qmin at all, or RT is sublinear in qmin, which would correspond to a
dependency RT = O˜(q
−f
min
) with f < 1.
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derived, N1/3 dependency of RT w.r.t. the number of ads might be correct.
We do not report results on K since the complexity of finding the optimal
allocation f ∗ becomes intractable for values of K larger than 8, as shown
in [32], making the empirical evaluation of the bound impossible.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the problem of learning the click through rates of
ads in sponsored search auctions with truthful mechanisms. This problem is
highly challenging, combining online learning tools (i.e., regret minimization
algorithms) together with economic tools (i.e., truthful mechanisms). While
almost all the literature focused on single–slot scenarios, here we focused
on multi–slot scenarios. With multiple slots it is necessary to adopt a user
model to characterize the valuations of the users over the different slots.
Here, we adopted the cascade model, that is the most common model used
in the literature. In the paper, we studied a number of scenarios, each with
a specific information setting of unknown parameters. For each scenario,
we designed a truthful learning mechanism, studied its economic properties,
derived an upper bound over the regret, and, for some mechanisms, also a
lower bound. We considered both the regret over the auctioneer’s revenue
and the social welfare.
We showed that for the cascade model with only position–dependent ex-
ternalities it is possible to design a truthful no–regret learning mechanism
for the general case in which all the parameters are unknown. Our mecha-
nism presents a regret O(T 2/3) and it is incentive compatible in expectation
over the random component of the mechanism. However, it remains open
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whether or not it is possible to obtain a regret O(T 1/2). For specific sub
cases, in which some parameters are known to the auctioneer, we obtained
better results in terms of either incentive compatibility, obtaining dominant
strategy truthfulness, or regret, obtaining a regret of zero. We showed that
for the cascade model with the position– and ad–dependent externalities it
is possible to design a dominant strategy truthful mechanism with a regret
O(T 2/3) when only the quality is unknown. Instead, even when the cascade
model is only with ad–dependent externalities and no parameter is known it
is not possible to obtain a no–regret dominant strategy truthful mechanism.
The proof of this result would seem to suggest that the same result holds
also when truthfulness is in expectation. However, we did not produce any
proof for that, leaving it for future works. Finally, we empirically evaluated
the bounds we provided, showing that the dependency of each bound from
the parameters is empirically confirmed.
Two main questions deserve future investigation. The first question con-
cerns the study of a lower bound for the case in which there are only position–
dependent externalities for different notions of truthfulness in expectation,
e.g., both in expectation over the click realizations and in expectation over
the random component of the mechanism. Furthermore, it is open whether
the separation of exploration and exploitation phases is necessary and, in the
negative case, whether it is possible to obtain a regret O(T 1/2). The second
question concerns a similar study related to the case with only ad–dependent
externalities.
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Appendix A. Monotonicity and Myerson’s payments
Consider a generic direct–revelation mechanismM = (N ,Θ, V, f, {pi}i∈N )
as defined in Section 3.2. A single–parameter linear environment is such that
• the type of each agent i is a scalar vi (single–parameter assumption),
• the utility function of agent i is ui(vˆ) = zi(f(vˆ))vi − pi(vˆ) where zi :
Θ→ ℜ is a function of the allocation (linear assumption).
An allocation function f is monotone in a single–parameter linear environ-
ment if
zi(f(vˆ−i, v′′i )) ≥ zi(f(vˆ−i, v′i))
for any v′′i ≥ v′i. Essentially, zi is monotonically increasing in vi once vˆ−i
has been fixed. In such environments, it is always possible to design a DSIC
mechanism imposing the following payments [27]:
pi(vˆ) = hi(vˆ−i) + zi(f(vˆ))vˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
zi(f(vˆ−i, u))du (A.1)
where hi(vˆ−i) is a generic function not depending on the type of agent i.
Appendix B. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 1
We start by reporting the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. (Proposition 1) The derivation is a simple application of the Hoeffd-
ing’s bound. We first notice that each of the terms in the empirical average
q˜i (10) is bounded in [0; 1/Λpi(i;θt)]. Thus we obtain
P (|qi − q˜i| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2|Bi|
2ǫ2∑
t∈Bi
(
1
Λpi(i;θt)
− 0)2
)
=
δ
N
.
By reordering the terms in the previous expression we have
ǫ =
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Λ2pi(i;θt)
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
,
which guarantees that all the empirical estimates q˜i are within ǫ of qi for all
the ads with probability, at least, 1− δ. 
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Before stating the main result of this section, we need the following tech-
nical lemma.
Lemma 1. For any slot sm with m ∈ K, with probability 1− δ,
max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m)
≤ 1, (B.1)
where the operator max(·; ·) is defined as in Section 4.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Proposition 1. We
consider the optimal allocation θ∗ defined in (2) and the estimated allocation
θ˜ defined in (14). We denote h = α(m; θ∗) = argmax
i∈N
(qivˆi;m), i.e., the index
of the ad allocated in a generic slot in position m. There are two possible
scenarios:
• If π(h; θ˜) < m (the ad is displayed into a higher slot in the approximated
allocation θ˜), then ∃j ∈ N s.t. π(j; θ∗) < m ∧ π(j; θ˜) ≥ m. Thus
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) ≥ q˜+j vˆj ≥ qj vˆj ≥ qhvˆh = max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
where the second inequality holds with probability 1− δ;
• If π(h; θ˜) ≥ m (the ad is displayed into a lower or equal slot in the
approximated allocation θ˜), then
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) ≥ q˜+h vˆh ≥ qhvh = max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
where the second inequality holds with probability 1− δ.
In both cases, the statement follows. 
Proof. (Theorem 1)
Step 1: expected payments. The proof follows steps similar to those
in [12]. We first recall that for any ad ai such that π(i; θ
∗) ≤ K, the expected
payments of the VCG mechanism in this case reduce to (8):
p∗i (vˆ) =
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ∗)+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(qj vˆj ; l)
]
,
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while, given the definition of A–VCG1 reported in Section 4.1, the expected
payments for at t–th iteration of the auction are
p˜i(vˆ) =
{
0 if t ≤ τ (exploration)
p˜i(vˆ) if t > τ (exploitation)
where the payment for any ad ai such that π(i; θ˜) ≤ K is defined in (15) as
p˜i(vˆ) =
qi
q˜+i
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl)max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l).
Step 2: exploration regret. Since for any t ≤ τ A–VCG sets all the
payments to 0 the per–round regret is
rt =
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ)− 0) =
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆lmax
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1) ≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
Λm,
(B.2)
where ∆l = Λl −Λl+1. The exploration regret is obtained by summing up rt
over τ steps.
Step 3: exploitation regret. Now we focus on the expected (w.r.t. clicks)
per–round regret during the exploitation phase. According to the definition
of payments, at each round t ∈ {τ + 1, . . . , T} of the exploitation phase we
bound the per–round regret rt as
rt =
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ)− p˜α(m;θ˜)(vˆ))
=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)−
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
qα(m;θ˜)

=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
 maxi∈N (qivˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)

=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m)
vˆα(m;θ˜)
 maxi∈N (qivˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)
 .
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By definition of the max operator, since l + 1 > m, it follows that
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m)
≤ 1. (B.3)
Finally, from Lemma 1 and vˆα(m;θ˜) ≤ vmax, it follows that
rt ≤
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
vmax∆l(q˜
+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)) ≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
[
(q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜))
K∑
l=m
∆l
]
,
(B.4)
with probability at least 1 − δ. Notice that, by definition of ∆l,
∑K
l=m∆l =
Λm −ΛK+1 = Λm. Furthermore, from the definition of q˜+i and using (13) we
have that for any ad ai, q˜
+
i − qi = q˜i − qi + η ≤ 2η, with probability at least
1− δ. Thus, the difference between the payments becomes13
rt ≤ 2vmaxη
K∑
m=1
Λm ≤ 2vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
N
δ
. (B.5)
with probability 1− δ.
Step 4: global regret. By summing up the regrets reported in (B.2) and
(B.5), we obtain
RT ≤ vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)(
2(T − τ)
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
,
that can be further simplified give that
∑K
m=1 Λm ≤ K as
RT ≤ vmaxK
(
2(T − τ)
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
. (B.6)
Step 5: parameters optimization. Beside describing the performance of
A–VCG1, the previous bound also provides guidance for the optimization of
13Notice that in the logarithmic term the factor of 2 we have in Proposition 1 disappears
since in this proof we only need the one-sided version of it.
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the parameters τ and δ. We first simplify the bound in (B.6) as
RT ≤ vmaxK
(
2T
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
≤ vmaxK
(
2T
Λmin
√
2N
Kτ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
, (B.7)
where we used τ ≤ T and
K∑
m=1
1/Λ2m ≤ K/Λ2min, with Λmin = minm∈K Λm. In
order to find the optimal value of τ , we take the derivative of the previous
bound w.r.t. τ and set it to zero and obtain
vmaxK
(
− τ− 32 T
Λmin
√
2N
K
log
N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = 2
1
3K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3Λ
− 2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
.
Substituting this value of τ into (B.7) leads to the optimized bound
RT ≤ vmaxK
(
3 · 2 13K− 13T 23N 13Λ−
2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
)
.
We are now left with the choice of the confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), which
can be easily set to optimize the asymptotic rate (i.e., ignoring constants and
logarithmic factors) as
δ = K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3
with the trivial constraint that T > N
K
(given by δ < 1). We thus obtain the
final bound
RT ≤ 4 · 2 13vmaxΛ−
2
3
minK
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 13
,
which concludes the proof. 
Appendix C. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 4
Unlike the setting considered in Theorem 1, here the regret is only due
to the use of a randomized mechanism, since no parameter estimation is
actually needed.
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Proof. (Theorem 4)
Step 1: payments and additional notation. We recall that according
to [27] and [35] the expected VCG payments can be written as in (22) in the
form
p∗i (vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu,
while the A–VCG2′ mechanism prescribes contingent payments as in (23),
which lead to expected payments
pB,∗i (vˆ) = Ex
[
Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ
]
qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex
[
Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u
]
qidu. (C.1)
Given the randomness of the allocation function of A–VCG2′, we need to
introduce the following additional notation:
• s ∈ {0, 1}N is a vector where each element si denotes whether the i–th
bid has been preserved or it has been modified by the self–resampling
procedure, i.e., if xi = vˆi then si = 1, otherwise if xi < vˆi then si = 0.
Notice that s does not provide information about the actual modified
values x;
• Ex|s[Λpi(i;f(x))|vˆ] is the expected value of prominence associated with
the slots allocated to ad ai conditioned on the declared bids vˆ being
perturbed as in s.
Let S = {s|π(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤ K + 1 ⇒ si = 1 ∀i ∈ N} be all the realizations
where the self–resampling procedure does not modify the bids of the first
K + 1 ads, i.e., the K ads displayed applying f ∗ to the true bids vˆ and the
first non-allocated ad.
Step 2: the regret. We proceed by studying the per–ad regret ri(vˆ) =
p∗i (vˆ) − pB,∗i (vˆ). Given the previous definitions, we rewrite the expected
payments pB,∗i (vˆ) as
pB,∗i (vˆ) =
(
P[s ∈ S]Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ)) + P[s 6∈ S]Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]
)
qivˆi
−
∫ vˆi
0
(
P[s ∈ S]Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u)) + P[s 6∈ S]Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]
)
qidu
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= P[s ∈ S]
(
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu
)
+ P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu
)
= P[s ∈ S]p∗i (vˆ)
+ P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu
)
,
where in the last expression we used the expression of the VCG payments in
(22) according to [27] and [35]. The per–ad regret is
ri(vˆ) = p
∗
i (vˆ)− pB,∗i (vˆ)
= p∗i (vˆ)− P[s ∈ S]p∗i (vˆ)
− P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu
)
= P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (vˆ)
− P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rBi,1
.
Since we have that u ≤ vˆi in the integral and since the allocation function
defined in [16] is monotone, we have that
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u] ≤ Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ],
which implies that rBi,1 is non–negative. Thus the regret r
B
i can be bounded
as
rBi (vˆ) = P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (vˆ)−P[s 6∈ S]rBi,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (vˆ) ≤ P
[∃j : sj = 0 ∧ π(j; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤ K + 1]vmax
≤
∑
j∈N :pi(j;f∗(vˆ))≤K+1
P[sj = 0]vmax = (K + 1)µvmax ≤ 2Kµvmax.
(C.2)
We can now compute the bound on the global regret RT . Since this mecha-
nism does not require any estimation phase, the regret is simply
RT ≤ 2K2µvmaxT.
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Step 3: parameters optimization. In this case, the bound would suggest
to choose a µ → 0, but it is necessary to consider that with µ → 0 the
variance of the payment goes to infinity.
Appendix D. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 8
The proof of Theorem 8 needs to combine the result of Theorem 4 and
the regret due to the estimation of the parameters similarly to what is done
in Theorem 1.
Proof. (Theorem 8)
Step 1: payments and the regret. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4,
we use the form of the VCG payments as in (22):
p∗i (vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu,
while A–VCG3 uses the contingent payments in (26), which in expectation
become
p˜Bi (vˆ) = Ex
[
Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ
]
qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex
[
Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ−i, u
]
qidu. (D.1)
We also need to introduce the expected payments
p˜i(vˆ) = Λpi(i;f˜(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f˜(vˆ−i,u))qidu,
which correspond to the VCG payments except from the use of the estimated
allocation function f˜ instead of f ∗.
Initially, we compute an upper bound over the per–ad regret ri = p
∗
i −
pi for each round of the exploitation phase and we later use this result to
compute the upper bound for the regret over the whole time interval (RT ).
We divide the per–ad regret in two different components:
ri(vˆ) = p
∗
i (vˆ)− p˜Bi (vˆ) (D.2)
= p∗i (vˆ)− pB,∗i (vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cSRP regret
+ pB,∗i (vˆ)− p˜Bi (vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning regret
= rBi (vˆ) + r
L
i (vˆ),
where
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• rBi (vˆ) is the regret due to the use of the approach proposed in [16]
instead of the VCG payments, when all the parameters are known;
• rLi (vˆ) is the regret due to the uncertainty on the parameters when the
payments defined in [16] are considered.
For the definitions of s and Ex|s[Λpi(i;f(x))|vˆ] refer to the proof of Theorem 4.
Step 2: the cSRP regret. We can reuse the result obtained in the proof
of Theorem 4. In particular, we can use the bound in (C.2), i.e. rBi (vˆ) ≤
(K + 1)µvmax. Given that we have assumed N > K, in the remaining parts
of this proof we will use the following upper bound: rBi (vˆ) ≤ (K + 1)µvmax ≤
Nµvmax.
Step 3: the learning regret. Similar to the previous step, we write the
learning expected payments based on the cSRP in (D.1) as
p˜Bi (vˆ) = P[s = 1]p˜i(vˆ) + P[s 6= 1]
(
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu
)
.
Then the per-ad regret is
rLi (vˆ) = p
B,∗
i (vˆ)− p˜Bi (vˆ)
= P[s = 1](p∗i (vˆ)− p˜i(vˆ))+
+ P[s 6= 1]
(
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ]qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤vmax
+
−Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ]qivˆi +
∫ vˆi
0
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|vˆ−i, u]qidu︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−rBi,1≤0
)
≤ p∗i (vˆ)− p˜i(vˆ) +Nµvmax.
We now simply notice that payments p˜i are WVCG payments corresponding
to the estimated allocation function f˜ and can be written as
p˜i(vˆ) =
qi
q˜+i
[
S˜W
(
f˜−i (vˆ) , vˆ
)− S˜W−i(f˜ (vˆ) , vˆ)],
which allows us to use the results stated in proof of Theorem 1 and from
(B.4) we can conclude that∑
i:pi(i;f∗(vˆ)≤K)
(p∗i (vˆ)− p˜i (vˆ)) ≤ 2vmaxη
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη.
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Step 4: the global regret. We now bring together the two instantaneous
regrets and we have that at each round of the the exploitation phase we
have the regret r =
∑N
i=1 ri. We first notice that the expected instantaneous
regret ri for each ad ai is defined as the difference between the VCG payment
p∗i (vˆ) and the (expected) payments computed by the estimated randomized
mechanism pi(vˆ). We notice that p
∗
i (vˆ) can be strictly positive only for theK
displayed ads, while pi(vˆ) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N , due to the mechanism randomization.
Thus, p∗i (vˆ) − pi(vˆ) > 0 only for at most K ads. Thus we obtain the per–
round regret
r ≤
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(vˆ))≤K
ri =
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(vˆ))≤K
(
rBi + r
L
i
)
≤ KNµvmax +
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(vˆ))≤K
(p∗i (vˆ)− p˜i (vˆ) +Nµvmax)
≤ KNµvmax + 2Kvmaxη +KNµvmax = 2Kvmaxη + 2KNµvmax.
Finally, the global regret becomes
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+ 2µN
)
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 5: parameters optimization. We first simplify further the previous
bound as
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
T
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+ 2µN
)
+ τ + δT
]
. (D.3)
We first optimize the value of τ , take the derivative of the previous bound
w.r.t. τ and set it to zero and obtain
vmaxK
(
− τ− 32T
√
N log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced into (D.3) we obtain
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ 2TµN + δT
]
.
66
The optimization of the asymptotic order of the bound can then be obtained
by setting µ and δ so as to equalize the second and third term in the bound.
In particular by setting
µ = T−
1
3N−
2
3 and δ = T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
we obtain the final bound
RT ≤ 6vmaxKT 23N 13
(
log
(
2N
2
3T
1
3
)) 13
.
Appendix E. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 10
Before deriving the proof of Theorem 10, we prove two lemmas that we
use in the following proofs.
Lemma 2. Let G be an arbitrary space of allocation functions, then for any
g ∈ G, when |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability 1− δ, we have
−2Kvmaxη ≤ SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η,
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. By using the definition of SW and S˜W we have the following se-
quence of inequalities
SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)−S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
≤
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))vˆj
(
qj − q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
qj − qj qi
q˜+i
+ qj
qi
q˜+i
− q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
)
= vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
[
qj
(
q˜+i − qi
q˜+i
)
+ (qj − q˜+j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
qi
q˜+i
]
≤ vmax
qmin
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜i − qi + η) ≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η.
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The second statement follows from
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
−SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
− qj
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
− qj
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜+j − qj) ≤ 2Kvmaxη.

Lemma 3. Let G be an arbitrary space of allocation functions, then for any
g ∈ G, when |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability 1− δ, we have
0 ≤
(
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη,
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. The first inequality follows from
SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
qj − q˜+j
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(qj − q˜+j ) ≤ 0,
while the second inequality follows from
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)−SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
q˜+j − qj
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
q˜+j − qj
)
= vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜j + η − qj) ≤ 2Kvmaxη.

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We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Theorem 10.
Proof. (Theorem 10)
Step 1: per–ad regret. We first compute the instantaneous per–ad regret
ri = p
∗
i (vˆ) − p˜i(vˆ) at each round of the exploitation phase for each ad ai.
According to the definition of payments we have
ri = SW(f
∗
−i(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(f˜−i(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1i
+ S˜W−i(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
− SW−i(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2i
.
We bound the first term through Lemma 2 and the following inequalities
r1i = SW(f
∗
−i(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(f ∗−i(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
+ S˜W(f ∗−i(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
− S˜W(f˜−i(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
≤ max
f∈F−i
(
SW(f(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(f(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
)
+
(
S˜W(f ∗−i(vˆ), vˆ)− max
f∈F−i
S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
qi
q˜+i
≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η,
with probability 1− δ. We rewrite r2i as
r2i =
(
S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)− Γpi(i;f˜(vˆ))(f˜(vˆ))q˜+i vˆi
) qi
q˜+i
− SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ) + Γpi(i;f∗(vˆ))(f ∗(vˆ))qivˆi
= S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r3i
+
(
Γpi(i;f∗(vˆ)) (f
∗(vˆ))− Γpi(i;f˜(vˆ))(fˆ(vˆ))
)
qivˆi.
We now focus on the term r3i and use Lemma 2 to bound it as
r3i = S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f˜(vˆ), vˆ) + SW(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)−max
f∈F
SW(f(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ max
f∈F
(
S˜W(f(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f(vˆ), vˆ)
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη.
Step 2: exploitation and global regret. We define I = {i|π(i; f (vˆ)) ≤
K ∨ π(i; f˜(vˆ)) ≤ K, i ∈ N}, |I| ≤ 2K. It is clear that only the ads ai s.t.
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i ∈ I have a regret ri 6= 0. The other ads, i 6∈ I, have both p∗i (vˆ) = 0 and
p˜i(vˆ) = 0. Thus, we can bound the regret r, at each exploitative round, in
the following way
r =
∑
i∈I
(r1i + r
2
i )
≤
∑
i∈I
(2Kvmax
qmin
η + 2Kvmaxη
)
+
∑
i∈I
(
Γpi(i;f∗(vˆ))(f
∗(vˆ))− Γpi(i;f˜(vˆ))(f˜(vˆ))
)
qivˆi
=
∑
i∈I
(2Kvmax
qmin
η + 2Kvmaxη
)
+
N∑
i=1
(
Γpi(i;f∗(vˆ))(f
∗(vˆ))− Γpi(i;f˜(vˆ))(f˜(vˆ))
)
qivˆi
≤ 8K
2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
=
8K2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)+
+ S˜W(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)−max
f∈F
S˜W(f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)
≤ 8K
2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
+ S˜W(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(f˜(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2
The remaining terms r1 and r2 can be easily bounded using Lemma 3 as
r1 ≤ 0 and r2 ≤ 2Kvmaxη.
Summing up all the terms we finally obtain
r ≤ 10K
2vmax
qmin
η
with probability 1−δ. Now, considering the instantaneous regret of the explo-
ration and exploitation phases, we obtain the final bound on the cumulative
regret RT as follows
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
10K
Γminqmin
√
N
2Kτ
log
N
δ
)
+ τ + δT
]
.
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Step 3: parameter optimization. Let c := 5√
2Γminqmin
, then we first
simplify the previous bound as
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
2cT
√
NK
τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
Taking the derivative with respect to τ leads to
vmaxK
(
− τ− 32 cT
√
NK log
N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = c
2
3T
2
3K
1
3N
1
3
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced in the bound, we obtain
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
3T
2
3 c
2
3N
1
3K
1
3
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
]
.
Finally, we choose δ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = K
1
3N
1
3 c
2
3T−
1
3 ,
which leads to the final bound
RT ≤ 4vmaxK 43 c 23T 23N 13
(
log
N
2
3T
1
3
K
1
3 c
2
3
) 1
3
Notice that this bound imposes constraints on the value of T , indeed, T > τ ,
thus T > c
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log N
δ
) 1
3 and δ < 1, thus T > c2KN , leading to:
T > c2KN max
{
log
N
δ
, 1
}
.
The problem of the previous bound is that τ and δ depends on qmin, which
is an unknown quantity. Thus actually choosing this values to optimize the
bound may be unfeasible. An alternative choice of τ and δ is obtained by
optimizing the bound removing the dependency on qmin. Let d =
5√
2Γmin
,
then we choose
τ = d
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
,
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and
δ = K
1
3N
1
3d
2
3T−
1
3 ,
which leads to the final bound
RT ≤ 4vmaxK 43T 23N 13 d
2
3
qmin
(
log
N
2
3T
1
3
K
1
3d
2
3
) 1
3
under the constraint that T ≥ KNd2. 
Appendix F. Deviation Regret
The definition of regret in (5) measures the cumulative difference between
the revenue of a VCG compared to the one obtained by A–VCG1 over T
rounds. Upper–bounds over this quantity guarantees that the loss in terms
of revenue does not linearly increase with T . As illustrated in the previous
sections, the key passage in the proofs is the upper–bounding of the regret at
each round of the exploitation phase (i.e., r =
∑N
i=1(p
∗
i − p˜i)). Nonetheless,
we notice that this quantity could be negative. In this section we introduce
a different notion of regret (R˜T ) that we study only for A–VCG1, leaving
for the future a more detailed analysis. Let us consider the following simple
example. Let N = 3, K = 1, vˆi = 1 for all the ads, and q1 = 0.1, q2 = 0.2,
and q3 = 0.3. Let assume that after the exploration phase we have q˜
+
1 = 0.1,
q˜+2 = 0.29, q˜
+
3 = 0.3. A standard VCG mechanism allocates ad a3 and asks for
a payment p∗3(vˆ) = 0.2. During the exploitation phase A–VCG1 also allocates
a3 but asks for an (expected) payment p˜3(vˆ) = (q˜
+
2 /q˜
+
3 )q3 = 0.29. Thus, the
regret in each exploitation round is r = p∗3(vˆ) − p˜3(vˆ) = −0.09. Although
this result might seem surprising, it is due to the fact that while both A–
VCG1 and VCG are truthful, in general A–VCG1 is not efficient. We recall
that a mechanism is efficient if for any set of advertisers it always maximizes
the social welfare. In the example, if for instance the true quality of ad a3
is q3 = 0.28, then the allocation induced by q˜
+s is not efficient anymore.
By dropping the efficiency constraint, it is possible to design mechanisms
with larger revenues than the VCG. For this reason, we believe that a more
complete characterization of the behavior of A–VCG1 compared to the VCG
should consider the deviation between their payments and not only the loss
in the revenue. In particular, let us define the regret as the deviation between
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the VCG and the approximated VCG:
R˜T (A) =
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
(p∗i − p˜it)
∣∣∣, (F.1)
We prove an upper–bound for the single–slot case (the extension of the
multi–slot results is straightforward).
Theorem 14. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T rounds with position–dependent cascade model with parame-
ters {Λm}Km=1 and accuracy η as defined in (13). For any parameter τ ∈
{0, . . . , T} and δ ∈ [0, 1], the A–VCG1 achieves a regret:
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
(
τ + (T − τ) 2η
qmin
+ δT
)
(F.2)
where qmin = mini∈N qi. By setting the parameters to
δ = N
1
3K−
1
3T−
1
3
τ = 2
1
3
K−
1
3N
1
3T
2
3
Λ
2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
,
the regret is
R˜T ≤ 4 · 2 13 K
− 1
3N
1
3T
2
3
qminΛ
2
3
min
(
logN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
. (F.3)
Proof. We initially provide a bound over the instantaneous regret during
the exploitation phase. We consider the two sides of the bound separately.
We have that for the first side of the bound we can use the result provided
in Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 1, i.e.,
r1 =
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ)− p˜α(m;θ˜)(vˆ))
≤ 2Kvmaxη,
with probability 1− δ.
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Now we bound the other side.
r2 =
K∑
m=1
(
p˜α(m;θ˜)(vˆ)− p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ)
)
=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
maxi∈N (q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
qα(m;θ˜) −max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)

≤ max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
maxi∈N (q˜+i vˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)
− 1

In order to proceed with the bound, notice that, for a generic ad ai we
have that q˜+i vˆi = (q˜i + η) vˆi ≤ (qi + 2η) vˆi ≤ qivˆi + 2ηqmin qivˆi.
Now, consider i′ = argmax
j∈N
(qj vˆj ; l+1), the ad displayed in sl+1 when the
true qualities are known, we can face two different situation:
• π
(
i′; f˜(vˆ)) ≥ π(i′; f ∗(vˆ)
)
: in this case we can easily conclude that
q˜+
α(l+1;f˜(vˆ))
vˆα(l+1;f˜(vˆ)) ≤ q˜+i′ vˆi′ ≤ qi′ vˆi′ + 2ηqmin qi′ vˆi′;
• π
(
i′; f˜(vˆ)
)
< π (i′; f ∗(vˆ)): in this case we can observe that qi′ vˆi′ +
2η
qmin
qi′ vˆi′ ≥ qj vˆj + 2ηqmin qj vˆj ∀j ∈ N s.t. π(j; f ∗(vˆ)) < π(i′; f ∗(vˆ)).
Thus, considering that ∃j ∈ N s.t. π(j; f ∗(vˆ)) < π(i′; f ∗(vˆ)) and
π(j; f˜(vˆ)) ≥ l + 1, we can conclude q˜+
α(l+1;f˜(vˆ))
vˆα(l+1;f˜(vˆ)) ≤ q˜+j vˆj ≤
qj vˆj +
2η
qmin
qj vˆj ≤ qi′ vˆi′ + 2ηqminqi′ vˆi′ .
Using these results we obtain
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi; l + 1) = q˜
+
α(l+1;f˜(vˆ))
vˆα(l+1;f˜(vˆ)) ≤
≤ qi′ vˆi′ + 2η
qmin
qi′ vˆi′ = max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1) +
1
qmin
2ηmax
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)
and thus
r2 ≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
maxi∈N (qivˆi; l + 1) + 1qmin2ηmaxi∈N (qivˆi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l + 1)
− 1

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≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
(
1 +
1
qmin
2η − 1
)
≤ vmax 1
qmin
2η
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Λm
≤ vmax 1
qmin
2ηK.
with probability 1− δ. As a result we have∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ)− p˜α(m;θ˜)(vˆ))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2vmaxK ηqmin ,
with probability 1− δ. The final bound on the expected regret is thus
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
(
τ + (T − τ) 2η
qmin
+ δT
)
(F.4)
We first simplify the previous bound as
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
τ + 2T
qmin
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
2N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ δT

≤ Kvmax
(
τ +
2T
qminΛmin
√
2N
Kτ
log
N
δ
+ δT
)
and choosing the parameters
τ = 2
1
3
K−
1
3N
1
3T
2
3
Λ
2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
δ = N
1
3K−
1
3T−
1
3
the final bound is
R˜T ≤ 4 · 2 13 K
− 1
3N
1
3T
2
3
qminΛ
2
3
min
(
logN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
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Remark (the bound). We notice that the bound is very similar to the
bound for the regret RT but now an inverse dependency on qmin appears.
This suggests that bounding the deviation between the two mechanisms is
more difficult than bounding the revenue loss and that as the qualities be-
come smaller, the A–VCG1 could be less and less efficient and, thus, have
a larger and larger revenue. This result has two important implications. (i)
If social welfare maximization is an important requirement in the design of
the learning mechanism, we should analyze the loss of A–VCG1 in terms
of social welfare and provide (probabilistic) guarantees about the number of
rounds the learning mechanism need in order to be efficient (see [10] for a
similar analysis). (ii) If social welfare is not a priority, this result implies
that a learning mechanism could be preferable w.r.t. to a standard VCG
mechanism. We believe that further theoretical analysis and experimental
validation are needed to understand better both aspects.
Appendix G. Proofs of Social-Welfare Regret in Theorems 2 and 11
Before stating the main result of this section, we need the following tech-
nical lemma.
Lemma 4. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and T
rounds, and a mechanism that separates the exploration (τ rounds) and the
exploitation phases (T −τ rounds). Consider an arbitrary space of allocation
functions G, g˜ ∈ argmaxg′∈G S˜W (g′(vˆ), vˆ) and |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability
1−δ. For any g ∈ G, an upper bound of the global regret over the SW (RSWT )
of the mechanism adopting g˜ instead of g is:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ] .
Proof. We now prove the bound on the social welfare, starting from the
cumulative instantaneous regret during the exploitation phase.
r = SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)
= SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)+
+ S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)−max
g′∈G
S˜W(g′(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+S˜W(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)
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≤ SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
+ S˜W(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2
The two remaining terms r1 and r2 can be easily bounded by using Lemma 3
r ≤ r1 + r2 ≤ 0 + 2Kvmaxη = 2Kvmaxη
with probability 1− δ.
Thus, we can conclude that:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ] .
Proof. (Theorem 2)
Step 1: global regret. We apply Lemma 4 to the position–dependent
cascade model with {qi}i∈N unknowns, obtaining
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
2(T − τ)
√
2
Λmin
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
Step 2: parameter optimization. First we notice that adopting the value
of the parameters identified in Theorem 1 we obtain an upper bound O˜(T
2
3 )
for the global regret RSWT .
In order to find values that better optimize the bound over RSWT , let
e :=
√
2
Λmin
, then we first simplify the previous bound as
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
2e
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
Taking the derivative of the previous bound w.r.t. τ leads to
vmaxK
(
−τ− 32 eT
√
N
K
log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = e
2
3T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
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Once replaced in the bound, we obtain
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
3e
2
3T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
]
Finally, we choose δ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = e
2
3K−
1
3N
1
3T−
1
3
given that δ < 1 this imply that T > e2K−1N .
The final bound is
RSWT ≤ 4vmaxe
2
3K
2
3N
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2e−
2
3N
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
Proof. (Theorem 11)
Step 1: global regret. We apply Lemma 4 to the model with position–
and ad–dependent externalities with {qi}i∈N unknowns, obtaining
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
2(T − τ)
√
2
Γmin
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
Step 2: parameter optimization. First we notice that adopting the value
of the parameters identified in Theorem 10 we obtain an upper bound O˜(T
2
3 )
for the global regret RSWT .
In order to find values that better optimize the bound over RSWT , it is
possible to use the procedure followed in the proof of Theorem 2 with e :=√
2
Γmin
:
RSWT ≤ 4vmaxe
2
3K
2
3N
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2e−
2
3N
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
Appendix H. Proof of Social-Welfare Regret in Theorem 5
Proof. (Theorem 5)
The bound over the global regret on the social welfare (RSWT ) can be easily
derived considering that each bid is modified by the self–resampling proce-
dure with a probability of µ. Thus we can define S ′ = {s′|s′ ∈ {0, 1}N , π(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤
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K ⇒ s′i = 1}, i.e. all the random realization where the self–resampling pro-
cedure does not modify the bids of the ads displayed when the allocation
function is f ∗ is applied to the true bids vˆ. Thus we have:
RSWT ≤ T
P [s ∈ S ′] · 0 + P [s 6∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kµ
Kvmax
 ≤ K2µvmaxT
Appendix I. Proof of Social-Welfare Regret Theorem 9
Proof. (Theorem 9)
Step 1: instantaneous regret. We start computing the instantaneous
regret over the SW during the exploitation phase.
First of all we introduce the following definition: S ′ = {s′|s′ ∈ {0, 1}N , π(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤
K ⇒ s′i = 1}, i.e. all the random realization where the self–resampling pro-
cedure does not modify the bids of the ads displayed when the allocation
function is f ∗ is applied to the true bids vˆ.
We now provide the bound over the regret.
r = SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
= P[s ∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
(
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
])
+
+ P[s 6∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kµ
(
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s6∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x),v)|vˆ
])
≤ SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
+
+Kµ
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s6∈S′ [SW(f˜(x),v)|vˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kvmax
≤ SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1≤0
+
+ Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
− Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2≤0
+
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+ Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
+ vmaxµK
2
≤ max
f∈F
(
Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f(x), vˆ)− SW(f(x), vˆ)|vˆ
])
+ vmaxµK
2
≤ max
f∈F
 ∑
j:pi(j;f(x))≤K
Λpi(j;f(x))vj(q˜j − qj)
+ vmaxµK2
≤ vmaxmax
f∈F
 ∑
j:pi(j;f(x))≤K
(q˜j − qj)
+ vmaxµK2
≤ 2vmaxKη + vmaxµK2 = vmaxK (2η +Kµ)
We provide a brief intuition of bounds r1 and r2. The bound r1 can be
explained noticing that when the bids of the ads displayed in f ∗(vˆ) are not
modified we have that α(m; f ∗(vˆ)) = α(m; f ∗(x)) where m ≤ K and x s.t.
s ∈ S ′. The bound for r2 can be understood noticing that when the bids
of the ads s.t. π(j; f ∗(x)) ≤ K are not modified and xi ≤ vˆi ∀i ∈ N , we
obtain S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ) = S˜W(f ∗(x),x) ≤ maxθ∈Θ S˜W(θ,x) = S˜W(f˜(x),x) ≤
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ).
Step 2: global regret. We can now compute the upper bound for the
global regret
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ)(2η +Kµ) + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+Kµ
)
+ τ + δT
]
Step 3: parameter optimization. We first simplify the previous bound
as
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
2T
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+KµT + τ + δT
]
Taking the derivative of the previous bound w.r.t. τ leads to
vmaxK
(
−τ− 32T
√
N log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
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which leads to
τ = N
1
3T
2
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
Once replaced in the bound, we obtain
RSWT ≤ 3vmaxKN
1
3T
2
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ µK2vmaxT + δvmaxKT
Finally, we choose δ and µ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = N
1
3T−
1
3
µ = K−1T−
1
3N
1
3
given that δ < 1 this imply that T > N and, given that µ < 1 we have
that T > N
K3
.
The final bound is
RSWT ≤ 5 · vmaxKN
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2N
2
3T
1
3
) 1
3
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